Since, then, God wills all to be saved, and on His part gives to all the graces necessary to attain salvation, we say that to all is given the grace of being able actually to pray (without need of any other new grace), and by praying then to obtain all the other aids for observing the precepts and being saved. But let it be noted that in saying "without need of any other new grace" it is not meant that sufficient grace gives the act of praying without the aid of adjuvant grace; for to perform any act of piety, besides exciting grace, adjuvant — or cooperating — grace is also undoubtedly required. What is meant is that sufficient grace gives everyone the power to pray actually, without a new prevenient grace that physically or morally determines man's will to put prayer into act. Therefore we shall here first register the many distinguished theologians who teach this opinion as certain, and then we shall prove it by authorities and by arguments. So hold Isambert, Cardinal du-Perron, Alphonsus le Moyne, and others who will be cited below, and at greater length and expressly Honoré Tournely; all these authors prove that each one with sufficient grace alone can actually pray, without need of any other aid, and by prayer obtain all the other graces for observing the more difficult things.
So also holds the most eminent Cardinal de Noris, who expressly proves that man, when the precept urges, prays, if he wills, with sufficient grace alone, without any other aid; and he proves it thus: Manifestum est potentiam ad orandum debere esse proximam in Justo sive Fideli; nam si Fidelis sit in potentia remota ad simpliciter orandum (non enim hic loquor de fervida oratione) non habebit aliam potentiam proximam pro impetranda oratione, alias procederetur in infinitum (It is evident that the power to pray must be proximate in the just man or the believer; for if the believer were in only remote power to pray simply — for I am not here speaking of fervent prayer — he would have no other proximate power for obtaining prayer; otherwise one would proceed to infinity). Since, in order to observe the precepts and be saved, it is necessary that we pray — as we proved at the beginning when speaking of the necessity of prayer — this learned author wisely says that everyone has the proximate power to pray, so as thereby to obtain by prayer the proximate power to do good; and therefore all can pray with sufficient grace alone, without any other aid. Otherwise, if in order to have the proximate power for the act of praying another power were needed, for this in turn another grace of power would be needed, and so the process would go on to infinity, and it would no longer be in man's hands to cooperate in his own salvation.
The same author in another place confirms the aforesaid doctrine more distinctly, saying: Etiam in statu naturae lapsae datur adjutorium sine quo (that is, the sufficient grace common to all), secus ac Jansenius contendit; quod quidem adjutorium efficit in nobis actus debiles, nempe orationes minus fervidas pro adimplendis mandatis; in ordine ad quorum executionem, adjutorium sine quo est tantum auxilium remotum, impetratorium tamen auxilii quo, sive gratiae efficacis, qua mandata implentur (Even in the state of fallen nature the adjutorium sine quo is given — that is, the sufficient grace common to all — otherwise than as Jansenius contends; and this aid indeed produces in us weak acts, namely, less fervent prayers for the fulfillment of the commandments; in order to whose execution the adjutorium sine quo is only a remote aid, yet one that obtains the auxilium quo, that is, the efficacious grace by which the commandments are fulfilled). So that the most eminent Noris holds it as certain that in the present state everyone has the aid sine quo — that is, sufficient grace, which without need of any other aid produces the prayer by which the efficacious grace for observing the precepts is then obtained. And thus is well understood the axiom universally received in the Schools: Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam (To him who does what is in himself, God does not deny grace); that is, to the man who prays, making good use of the sufficient grace by which he can already do the easy things, such as praying, God does not then deny the efficacious grace to perform the difficult things.
So also holds Louis Thomassin. This author first marvels at those who would have it that the sufficient aids do not in fact suffice to perform any good work, nor to avoid any sin: «Si enim (he says) haec auxilia vere auxilia sunt, et proximam dant potestatem, qui fit ut ex innumerabili hominum, qui ita juvantur, multitudine praeceptum observat nemo? Aut quomodo vere sufficientia sunt, si praeterea gratia efficax est necessaria? Non habet potestatem sufficientem, cui deest auxilium necessarium, quod in ejus potestate non est.» "For if (he says) these helps are truly helps, and give proximate power, how does it happen that, of the innumerable multitude of men who are thus helped, not one keeps the precept? Or how are they truly sufficient, if efficacious grace is necessary besides? He does not have sufficient power who lacks a necessary help that is not in his power." He means that sufficient grace, in order to be truly called sufficient, must give man the proximate and ready power to carry out the good act; but when another grace, the efficacious one, is required to perform the act, if man does not have the efficacious grace (at least mediately) that is already necessary for salvation, how can it be said that the sufficient grace gives him this proximate and ready power?
Since, as St. Thomas Aquinas says: «Deus non deficit ab agendo, quod est necessarium ad salutem.» "God does not neglect to do what is necessary for salvation." It is true, on the one hand, that God is not bound to give us His graces, because graces are not owed; but, on the other hand, supposing that He gives us the commandments, He is bound to give us the help necessary to observe them; and as the Lord obliges us actually to observe every precept at the time it applies, so must He likewise actually supply us with the help (at least mediate and remote) necessary to observe the precept, without the need of another grace not common to all.
Hence Thomassin concludes that, in order to reconcile the assertion that sufficient grace suffices for man to save himself with the assertion that, on the other hand, efficacious grace is necessary to observe the whole law, it is necessary to say that sufficient grace suffices for praying and for performing similar easy acts, and that by means of these the efficacious grace is then obtained to fulfill the difficult ones. And this is without doubt in conformity with the doctrine of St. Augustine, who teaches: «Eo ipso quo firmissime creditur Deum impossibilia non praecipere hinc admonemur et in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus.» "By the very fact that it is most firmly believed that God does not command impossible things, we are admonished both what to do in easy things and what to ask for in difficult things." On this text the aforesaid Cardinal Noris, after quoting it, likewise concludes, saying: «Igitur opera facilia, seu minus perfecta facere possumus, absque eo quod majus auxilium a Deo postulemus; quod tamen in difficilioribus petendum est.» "Therefore we can perform easy, or less perfect, works without asking a greater help from God; which, however, must be asked for in more difficult works." Thomassin also adduces the authorities of St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others on this subject, and says: «Omnibus ea placuere sufficientia auxilia vere sufficientia, quibus assentitur quandoque voluntas, quandoque non.» "All approved of these sufficient helps as truly sufficient, to which the will sometimes assents and sometimes does not." And he demonstrates this in four parts of his Work, adducing the authorities of the Schools over a long series of years, beginning from the year 1100.
Habert, Bishop of Vabres and Doctor of the Sorbonne, who was the first to write against Jansenius, says thus: «Censemus primo, quod immediate cum ipso effectu consensus completi (gratia) sufficiens non habet habitudinem, nisi contingenter, vel mediate... Arbitramur proinde gratiam sufficientem esse gratiam dispositionis ad efficacem, utpote ex cujus bono usu Deus postea gratiam completi affectus effectivam creatae voluntati concedat.» "We hold, first, that (sufficient grace) has no immediate connection with the very effect of complete consent, except contingently or mediately... We therefore judge that sufficient grace is a grace disposing to the efficacious, inasmuch as from the good use of it God afterwards grants to the created will the grace effective of complete affection."
And he says this after having previously stated: «Catholici D D. omnes, dari gratiam aliquam vere intrinsecam, quae possit consensum voluntatis ad bonum elicere, nec tamen propter liberam voluntatis resistentiam eundem aliquando eliciat, omnibus in Scholis professi sunt, et profitentur.» "All Catholic Doctors have professed, and do profess, in all the Schools, that there is given a truly inward grace which can elicit the consent of the will to good, and yet sometimes does not elicit it, on account of the resistance of the free will." And for this doctrine he cites Gamaches, Duval, Isambert, Perez, Le Moyne, and others. He then continues: «Auxilia igitur gratiae sufficientis sunt dispositiva ad efficacem, et efficacia secundum quid, effectus videlicet incompleti, impetrantis primo remote, propius, ac tandem proxime, qualis est actus Fidei, Spei, Timoris, atque inter haec omnia Orationis. Unde celeberrimus Alphonsus Lemoinus gratiam illam sufficientem docuit esse gratiam petendi, seu Orationis, de qua toties B. Augustinus.» "The helps, therefore, of sufficient grace are dispositive to the efficacious, and efficacious in a certain respect, namely of an incomplete effect, obtaining first remotely, then more nearly, and finally proximately, as is the act of faith, hope, fear, and among all these, of prayer. Hence the most celebrated Alphonsus Le Moyne taught that this sufficient grace is the grace of asking, or of prayer, of which St. Augustine speaks so often." So that, according to Habert, efficacious grace differs from sufficient grace in this: that the former is united with the completed effect; but the latter obtains its effect either contingently, that is, because sometimes it obtains it and sometimes not, or mediately, that is, by means of prayer. Moreover he says that sufficient grace, according to the good use made of it, disposes us to obtain the efficacious; hence he calls sufficient grace efficacious «secundum quid», "in a certain respect," that is, in respect of the effect begun but not completed. Lastly he says that sufficient grace is the grace of praying, of which it is for us to avail ourselves, according to St. Augustine. So that man has no excuse if he does not do that for the performance of which he already has sufficient grace, with which, without any other help, he either acts or at least obtains the greater help to act; and Habert asserts that this doctrine was already the common doctrine of the Sorbonne.
Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, likewise a theologian of the Sorbonne, cites over a thousand theologians who expressly teach that with sufficient grace easy works are indeed performed, and that man, acting with sufficient grace, then obtains the more abundant help for his perfect conversion. And it is precisely in this sense, as we have already said above, that he says the celebrated axiom accepted by the Schools must be understood: «facientibus quod in se est» (always understood as with sufficient grace) «Deus non denegat gratiam», "to those who do what is in them, God does not deny grace" — that is, the more abundant and efficacious grace.
The most learned Dionysius Petavius proves at length that man acts well with sufficient grace alone; and he goes so far as to assert that to say the contrary «monstruosum esset», "would be monstrous"; and that this doctrine is not only that of the theologians, but of the Church. Hence he says that the grace of observing the precepts follows upon prayer, and that God gives this gift of prayer at the same time that He imposes the precepts: «Donum istud quo Deus dat ut jussa faciamus, effectum Orationis subsequitur; et talis effectus legi comes datur.» "That gift by which God grants that we do what is commanded follows upon the effect of prayer; and such an effect is given as the companion of the law." So that, just as the law is imposed upon all, so is the gift of prayer given to all.
The author of the Theology for the use of the Seminary of Périgueux says that with sufficient grace alone: «Aliquis potest bene agere, et aliquando bene agit.» "one can act well, and sometimes does act well." So that, he adds: «Nihil vetat, ut ex duobus, aequali auxilio praeventis, faciliores actus (plenam conversionem praecedentes) saepissime unus faciat, alius non.» "nothing prevents that, of two persons forestalled by an equal help, one should very often perform the easier acts (which precede full conversion) and the other not." And this, he says, is in conformity with the doctrine of St. Augustine, and of St. Thomas Aquinas and his earliest disciples, especially Fr. Bartolomé de Medina,1 who wrote: Cum sola gratia sufficienti aliquando homo convertitur — “With sufficient grace alone, man is sometimes converted.” And I have found that Fr. Luis de Granada also asserted the same as the common doctrine of the theologians.2 He said: Duo auxiliorum genera Theologi statuunt, alterum sufficiens, alterum superabundans; et quidem priori auxilio homines aliquando convertuntur, aliquando converti renuunt — “Theologians distinguish two kinds of help, one sufficient and the other superabundant; and indeed, with the former help, men are sometimes converted, and sometimes refuse to be converted.” And afterwards he adds: Et quidem prius illud auxilium ad homines quam latissime patet, Theologi definiunt — “And theologians declare that this former help extends to men most widely.” Hence Petrocorensis says: Sic quosdam pietatis actus, nempe humiliter Deum deprecari, cum solo auxilio sufficienti (homo) facere potest, et aliquando facit, quibus se ad ulteriores gratias praeparat — “Thus, with sufficient help alone, man can perform certain acts of piety, namely, humbly imploring God, and sometimes does perform them, by which he prepares himself for further graces.” He says that this is the order of divine Providence concerning graces: ut priorum bono usui posteriores succedant — “that later graces should follow the good use of earlier ones.” And he concludes that full conversion and final perseverance infallibiliter (homines) promerentur Oratione, pro qua sufficiens gratia, quae nulli non praesto est, plenissime sufficit — “men infallibly obtain through prayer, for which sufficient grace, which is present to everyone, suffices most fully.”
The same is held by Cardinal d'Aguirre, a follower in all things of St. Augustine. Father Antonio Boucat, of the Order of St. Francis of Paola, maintains that everyone can, already by prayer, without new help, obtain the grace of conversion; and besides Gamaches, Duval, Habert, and Le Moyne, he cites in favor of this opinion Peter of Tarantasia, Bishop of Tulle,
Godert de Fonte and Henry of Ghent, Doctors of the Sorbonne, together with M. Lygné, Regius Professor, who in his treatise «de Gratia», "On Grace," demonstrates that sufficient grace not only gives the power of praying, as Le Moyne and Professor Elias have said, but also gives the power to perform some less difficult works. Gaudenzio Bontempi wrote the same, demonstrating that by sufficient grace the efficacious is obtained by means of prayer, which is given to all who wish to avail themselves of it. Cardinal Robert Pullo posits two graces: one always victorious, and another with which man sometimes acts and sometimes does not: «Alia (these are his words) qua adjutus Homo utrumlibet aut gratiae cooperans agit, aut ea spreta malum agere non desistit.» "Another (these are his words) by which man, being helped, does whichever of these two things he chooses: either he cooperates with grace and acts, or, despising it, he does not cease to do evil." Of the same opinion is also the learned Father Fortunato da Brescia, holding that all have the mediate grace of prayer for observing the precepts; and he holds it for certain that St. Augustine held the same.
28 Richard of St. Victor likewise teaches that there is a sufficient grace to which man sometimes consents and at other times resists. Dominic Soto asks why, of two persons whom God is most ready and desirous to convert, the one is drawn by grace and the other is not? And he answers: «Alia ratio reddi non potest, nisi quod alter praebet consensum, et cooperatur, alter vero non cooperatur.» "No other reason can be given, except that the one gives his consent and cooperates, while the other does not cooperate." Matthias Felicio, who wrote against Calvin, defines ordinary, that is, sufficient, grace thus: «Est motio Divina, sive instinctum quo movetur Homo ad bonum, nec alicui denegatur. Homines diversimode se habent ad illud instinctum, alii namque illi acquiescunt, sicque ad gratiam habitualem de congruo disponuntur, quia facientibus quod in se est non defore Deus creditur; alii repugnant.» "It is a divine motion, or instinct, by which man is moved to good, nor is it denied to anyone. Men behave differently toward this instinct: some acquiesce in it, and so are fittingly disposed to habitual grace, because it is believed that God will not be wanting to those who do what is in them; others resist it." Andreas Vega likewise says: «Haec autem auxilia quae omnibus dantur, a plerisque inefficacia vocantur, quia non semper habent suum effectum, sed aliquando a peccatoribus frustrantur.» "But these helps, which are given to all, are called by most inefficacious, because they do not always have their effect, but are sometimes frustrated by sinners." Therefore sufficient graces sometimes have their effect, and sometimes not.
Cardinal Gotti, in a passage of his Theology, seems not to dissent from us; for when the objection is raised there — how man can persevere if he wills, when it is not in his power to have the special aid that is required in order to persevere — he answers that although that special aid is not in man's power, in potestate tamen Hominis (these are his words) dicitur esse, quod ipse per Dei gratiam potest ab Eo petere, ac obtinere; et hoc modo in Hominis potestate dici potest esse, ut habeat auxilium ad perseverandum necessarium, illud impetrando orationibus (nevertheless it is said to be in the power of man, because he himself, through God's grace, can ask it of Him and obtain it; and in this way it can be said to be in the power of man to have the aid necessary for persevering, by obtaining it through prayer). Hence, for it to be verified that persevering is in man's power, just as it is necessary that he be able by prayer to obtain the aid to persevere actually, without need of another grace, so it is also necessary that with sufficient grace alone, common to all, without need of another special grace, he be able actually to pray, and by prayer then obtain perseverance; otherwise it cannot be said that everyone has the grace necessary to persevere, at least remote and mediate, by means of prayer. And if the most eminent Gotti does not understand it in this way, St. Francis de Sales certainly understands it so, saying that the grace of praying in act is given to everyone who wills to avail himself of it, and from this he concludes that it is in everyone's power to persevere. The Saint says this clearly in his Theotimus, where, after having shown that it is necessary to pray continually, in order to obtain from God the gift of perseverance, he adds: Now, since the gift of prayer is freely promised to all who will to consent to the heavenly inspirations, it is consequently in our power to persevere. And Cardinal Bellarmine teaches the same, saying: Auxilium sufficiens ad salutem pro loco et tempore, mediate vel immediate omnibus datur... Dicimus mediate vel immediate, quoniam iis qui usu rationis utuntur, immitti credimus a Deo sanctas inspirationes, ac per hoc immediate illos habere gratiam excitantem, cui si acquiescere velint, possint ad justificationem disponi, et ad salutem aliquando pertingere (A sufficient aid unto salvation is given to all, mediately or immediately, according to place and time... We say mediately or immediately, because we believe that holy inspirations are sent by God into those who have the use of reason, and that they thereby have immediately an exciting grace, to which, if they are willing to acquiesce, they can be disposed unto justification and at length attain unto salvation).
But let us now come to see the proofs of this opinion. It is proved first by the authority of St. Paul, who assures us that God is faithful, and will never permit us to be tempted beyond our strength, while He always gives us the aid (either immediate or mediated by means of prayer) to resist the assaults of the enemies: Fidelis Deus, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet cum tentatione proventum, ut possitis sustinere (God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will with the temptation also make the issue, that you may be able to bear it) (1 Cor. 10:13). Jansenius says that this text is to be understood of the Predestined alone; but this commentary of his has no foundation, since St. Paul writes to all the faithful of Corinth, whom he certainly did not suppose to be all predestined. Hence St. Thomas Aquinas rightly understands it generally of all, and says that God would not be faithful if He did not grant us (as far as it pertains to Him) those graces by means of which we can attain salvation: Non autem videretur esse fidelis, si nobis denegaret, in quantum in Ipso est, ea per quae pervenire ad Eum possemus (For He would not seem to be faithful if He denied us, insofar as it is in Him, those things by which we could come to Him). It is proved moreover by all those Scriptures with which the Lord exhorts us to be converted, and to have recourse to Him in order to ask Him for the graces necessary to salvation, with the promise of hearing us if we have recourse: Sapientia foris praedicat... dicens: Usque quo parvuli diligitis infantiam, et stulti ea quae sibi sunt noxia, cupient; etc. Convertimini ad correptionem meam. En proferam vobis spiritum meum; quia vocavi, et renuistis etc. Ego quoque in interitu vestro ridebo, et subsannabo vos (Wisdom preaches abroad... saying: How long, little ones, will you love childishness, and fools covet the things that are hurtful to them? etc. Be converted at My reproof; behold, I will pour forth My spirit to you; because I called, and you refused; etc. I also will laugh at your destruction, and will mock you) (Prov. 1:20ff.). This exhortation, Convertimini (Be converted), says Bellarmine, would be altogether ridiculous if God did not grant sinners the aid, at least mediated through prayer, to be converted. Moreover, in the same text quoted, interior grace is already expressed (En proferam vobis spiritum meum — Behold, I will pour forth My spirit to you), with which God calls sinners and gives them the actual aid to be converted if they will. Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis, et onerati estis, et ego reficiam vos (Come to Me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you) (Matt. 11:28). Venite, et arguite me, dicit Dominus, si fuerint peccata vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix dealbabuntur (Come, and accuse Me, says the Lord: if your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow) (Isa. 1:18). Petite, et dabitur vobis (Ask, and it shall be given you) (Matt. 7:7). And the Lord tells us the same in a thousand other places cited above. Now if God did not give everyone the grace of actually having recourse to Him, and of actually praying to Him, all these invitations and exhortations would be vain, in saying: Come, all of you, and I will satisfy you. Seek, and it shall be given you.
It is proved secondly, and clearly, by the text of the Council of Trent in Session 6, Chapter 11. I beg the reader to read attentively this proof from the Council of Trent, which (if I am not mistaken) seems evident. The Innovators said that, since man had been deprived of free will by the sin of Adam, man's will now does nothing in good acts, but is passively led to receive them from God, without itself producing them; and hence they inferred that the observance of the precepts is impossible for those who are not efficaciously moved and predetermined by grace to avoid evil and to do good. Against this error the Council pronounced the sentence taken from St. Augustine: Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis (God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding He admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot, and He helps you so that you may be able).
The Council, then, in order to prove against the heretics that the divine precepts are impossible to no one, declared that all men have the aid to do good, or at least the grace of prayer by which they then obtain the greater aid to do it. By which is meant that everyone with sufficient grace can do the easy things (such as praying) without need of any other extraordinary grace, and by praying obtain the strength to do the difficult things, according to the doctrine of St. Augustine already cited above: Eo ipso quod firmissime creditur, Deum justum et bonum impossibilia non potuisse praecipere, hinc admonemur, et in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus (By the very fact that it is most firmly believed that God, being just and good, could not have commanded impossible things, we are hence admonished both what we are to do in easy things and what we are to ask in difficult ones). So that according to the Council the divine precepts are possible to all, at least by means of prayer, by which the greater aid to observe them is then obtained. If, then, God has imposed
His precepts on all, and has made their observance possible to all, at least mediately by means of prayer, it must necessarily be concluded that all have the grace of praying; otherwise, for one who lacked this grace, the precepts would not be possible. And since the Lord by means of prayer gives the actual grace to do good, and thereby renders all His precepts possible, so also He gives to all the actual grace of praying: otherwise, for one who did not have the actual grace of praying, the precepts would be rendered impossible, since he could not, at least by means of prayer, obtain the aid to observe them.
This being granted, it avails nothing to say that those words, Monet (Deus) facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis (He admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot), are to be understood of the mere power to pray, and not of actually praying; because (we answer) if the common and ordinary grace gave nothing but the power to pray, and not actually praying, the Council would not have said, Monet facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis (He admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot), but would have said: Monet posse facere et posse petere (He admonishes you to be able to do and to be able to ask). Moreover, if the Council had wished to declare here nothing else than that everyone can observe the precepts, or can pray to obtain the grace to observe them, and had not meant to speak of actual grace, it would not have said Monet facere quod possis (He admonishes you to do what you can); since this monet properly refers to actual operation, and signifies not the instructing of the mind, but the moving of the will to do that good which it actually can already do. Having said, therefore, Monet facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis (He admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot), it has expressed too clearly not only the power to act and the power to pray, but also actually acting and actually praying; seeing that if man, in order to act and to pray in act, needed another extraordinary grace which he has not, to what purpose would the Lord admonish him to do or to ask what he cannot actually do or ask without efficacious grace? Speaking judiciously on this point, Fr. Fortunatus of Brescia says thus: If all were not given the actual grace of praying, but in order to pray efficacious grace were needed, which is not common to all, praying would be impossible for many who lack this efficacious grace; hence it would ill be said that God monet petere quod non possis (admonishes you to ask for what you cannot), because He would be admonishing to do a thing for the accomplishment of which the actual aid is lacking, without which it cannot be accomplished. So that the divine admonition to act and to pray must be understood of acting and of praying in act, without need of other extraordinary grace. And this is precisely what St. Augustine meant to convey to us when he said: Hinc admonemur et in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus [Hence we are admonished both what to do in easy things and what to ask for in difficult things]; for he supposes that if not all have the grace to do difficult things, at least all have the grace to pray, prayer being already easy for all — as he likewise supposes in having already said beforehand what the Council of Trent later taught: Monet Deus facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis [God admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot]. Let us narrow the argument. The Council says that God does not impose impossible precepts, because He either gives the help to observe them, or gives the grace to pray in order to obtain this help, which He already grants to the one who prays. Now if it were ever true that the Lord does not give to all the grace, at least through the mediation of prayer, to actually observe all His precepts, then what Jansenius said would be true: that for some precepts even the just man lacks the grace to observe them in act.
I do not know how the above-cited text of the Council of Trent could otherwise be understood or explained, unless sufficient grace gave everyone the power to actually pray, without efficacious grace, which our opponents suppose necessary to put every pious work into act. And supposing (as they maintain) such a need of a new grace to actually pray, I do not know how that other teaching of the same Council could stand: Deus sua gratia semel justificatos non deserit, nisi prius ab eis deseratur [God does not abandon those once justified by His grace, unless He is first abandoned by them]. Sess. 6. cap. 11. If even to actually pray (I say) ordinary sufficient grace were not enough, but efficacious grace — not common to all — were needed, it would follow that when the just man is tempted to commit the first mortal sin, and God does not give him the efficacious grace, at least to pray in order to obtain the strength to resist, then, since he does not resist the temptation, it would have to be said rather that the just man is abandoned by God before he abandons God, because he lacks the efficacious grace necessary to resist.
Our adversaries oppose us with a certain passage of St. Augustine, where the Saint seems to declare that the grace of prayer is not given to all: Nonne aliquando ipsa oratio nostra sic tepida est, vel potius frigida, et pene nulla, et ita nulla ut neque hoc in nobis cum dolore advertamus, quia si hoc nolemus, jam oramus [Is not our very prayer at times so tepid, or rather cold, and almost nothing — so nothing that we do not even notice it in ourselves with sorrow; for if we were displeased by it, we would already be praying?]. But to this Cardinal
Sfondrati wisely replies, saying: Aliud est peccatores non orare, aliud non habere qua orare possint [It is one thing for sinners not to pray, another for them not to have the means by which they can pray]. St. Augustine does not say that some lack the grace to pray as they ought; he says only that at times our prayer is so cold that it is almost nothing — not for lack of the Divine help to pray better, but through our own fault, which renders prayer null. Tournely replies in the same way, speaking of the first condemned proposition of Jansenius, and says: Justi non orant semper, ut oportet. Eorum culpa est, quod ita non orent, cum habeant ex gratia vires ad orandum. S. Augustinus ait quidem orationem nostram aliquando frigidam, ac paene nullam esse; at non ait deesse gratiam, per quam oratio ardentior fieri posset [The just do not always pray as they ought; it is their fault that they do not so pray, since they have from grace the strength to pray. St. Augustine indeed says that our prayer is sometimes cold and almost nothing; but he does not say that grace is lacking by which prayer could become more ardent]. Moreover, on this same passage of St. Augustine, Cardinal de Noris writes that with tepid prayer one at least obtains more fervent prayer, and with this one then obtains the efficacious grace to observe the precepts: Colligo ipsammet tepidam Orationem fieri a nobis cum adjutorio sine quo non, ac ordinario concursu Dei, cum sint actus debiles etc. et tamen tepida Oratione impetramus spiritum ferventioris Orationis, qui nobis adjutorio quo donatur [I gather that even tepid prayer is made by us with the help without which we cannot act, and with the ordinary concurrence of God, since they are weak acts etc.; and yet by tepid prayer we obtain the spirit of more fervent prayer, which is given to us as a help]. And he confirms this with the authority of the same holy Doctor, who on Psalm 17 wrote thus: Ego libera et valida intentione preces ad Te direxi, quoniam ut hanc habere possem, exaudisti me infirmius orantem [I directed my prayers to You with a free and strong intention, for, that I might have it, You heard me praying more weakly].
Nor does that stand in the way either which the same St. Augustine says on the words of St. Paul, Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus [the Spirit intercedes for us with unutterable groanings] — namely, that the Holy Spirit is the one who interpellare nos facit, nobisque interpellandi affectum [makes us intercede and gives us the desire to intercede]. For by this the Saint means nothing else, against the Pelagians, than that no one can pray without grace. And he himself explains it thus, commenting on Psalm 52, where he writes: Quod dono Illius tu facis, Ille facere dicitur: quia sine Illo tu non faceres [What you do by His gift, He is said to do, because without Him you would not do it].
Thirdly, our opinion is proved by what the holy Fathers say of it. St. Basil says: Ubi tamen quis permissus est in tentationem incidere, eventum, ut sufferre possit, et voluntatem Dei per Orationem petere [But when anyone is permitted to fall into temptation, let him ask through prayer for the outcome — that he may be able to endure — and for the will of God]. The Saint therefore says that when God permits a man to be tempted, He does so in order that the man may resist, asking for the Divine Will — that is, the grace to obtain the victory. The Saint thus supposes that where man does not have sufficient help to conquer the temptation, he at least has the actual and common help of prayer, to obtain the greater grace that is needed. St. John Chrysostom says in one place: Legem dedit, quae vulnera patefaceret, ut Medicum optarent [He gave the Law, which would lay bare the wounds, so that they would long for the Physician]. And in another: Nec quisquam poterit excusari, qui hostem vincere noluit, dum orare cessavit [Nor can anyone be excused who refused to conquer the enemy, in that he ceased to pray]. If someone did not have the grace necessary to actually pray, and through prayer to obtain the help to resist, he could excuse himself if he remained conquered. St. Bernard says the same: Qui sumus nos? aut quae fortitudo nostra? hoc quaerebat Deus, ut videntes defectum nostrum, et quod non esset auxilium aliud, ad ejus Misericordiam tota humilitate curramus [Who are we? Or what strength is ours? This God sought: that seeing our weakness, and that there was no other help, we should run to His Mercy in all humility]. The Lord has therefore imposed on us a law impossible according to our strength, so that by having recourse to Him and praying we may obtain the strength to observe it; but if the grace to actually pray were denied to someone, the law would become entirely impossible for him. Multi (says the same St. Bernard) queruntur deesse sibi Gratiam, sed multo justius Gratia quereretur deesse sibi multos [Many complain that grace is lacking to them; but much more justly might grace complain that many are lacking to it]. The Lord has far more reason to complain of us, because we fail the grace with which He assists us, than we have to complain that grace fails us.
But no Father says it more clearly than St. Augustine, in very many places. In one place he says: Magnum aliquid Pelagiani se scire putant, quando dicunt: non juberet Deus quod sciret non posse ab homine fieri. Quis hoc nesciat? Sed ideo jubet aliqua quae non possumus, ut noverimus quid ab Illo petere debeamus [The Pelagians think they know something great when they say: God would not command what He knew could not be done by man. Who does not know this? But He commands certain things that we cannot do precisely so that we may know what we ought to ask of Him]. In another place he says: Non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis. Ista tua propria peccata sunt: nulli enim homini ablatum est scire utiliter quaerere [It is not imputed to you as a fault that you are ignorant against your will, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know; nor that you do not bind up your wounded limbs, but that you despise the One who wills to heal you. These are your own sins: for no man has been deprived of knowing how to seek profitably]. Thus, says the Saint, the grace to pray — and through prayer to obtain the help to be converted — is denied to no one; otherwise, were this grace lacking, it could not be imputed to him as a fault if he is not converted. In another place: Quid ergo aliud ostenditur nobis, nisi quia et petere, et quaerere, et pulsare Ille concedit, qui ut haec faciamus jubet? [What else, then, is shown to us, but that He who commands us to do these things also grants us to ask, to seek, and to knock?]. In another place: Semel accipe, et intellige: nondum traheris? Ora ut traharis [Receive it once for all, and understand: are you not yet drawn? Pray that you may be drawn]. In another place he says: Quod ergo ignorat (anima) quid sibi agendum sit, ex eo quod nondum accepit; sed hoc quoque accipiet, si hoc quod accipit bene usa fuerit; accepit autem, ut pie et diligenter quaerat, si volet [That the soul does not know what it must do comes from its not yet having received; but it will receive this too, if it has made good use of what it has received; and it has received — if it wills — the grace to seek piously and diligently]. Note: Accepit autem, ut pie et diligenter quaerat [It has received, so that it may seek piously and diligently]; therefore everyone has the grace necessary to pray, and if he makes good use of it, he will receive the grace to do what before he could not immediately do. In another place: Homo qui voluerit, et non potuerit, oret ut habeat tantam (voluntatem), quanta sufficit ad implenda mandata; sic quippe adjuvatur, ut faciat quod jubetur [The man who wills and is not able should pray to have as great a will as suffices to fulfil the commandments; for so he is helped to do what is commanded]. In another: Praecepto admonitum est liberum arbitrium, ut quaereret Dei donum; at quidem sine suo fructu admoneretur, nisi prius acciperet aliquid dilectionis, ut addi sibi quaereret, unde quod jubebatur impleret [Free will was admonished by the precept to seek the gift of God; but it would be admonished without its fruit unless it first received something of love, so that it might seek to have added to it that whereby it might fulfil what was commanded]. Note,
Aliquid dilectionis [Something of love]: behold the sufficient grace, by which man can then, by praying, obtain the actual grace to fulfil the precept — ut addi sibi quaereret, unde quod jubebatur impleret [that he might seek to have added to him that whereby he might fulfil what was commanded]. In another place he says: Jubet ideo, ut facere justa conati, et nostra infirmitate faticati, adjutorium Gratiae poscere noverimus [He commands for this reason: that striving to do what is just, and wearied by our infirmity, we may know to ask for the help of grace]. By this the Saint already supposes that with sufficient grace we cannot yet do difficult things, but can through prayer obtain the help necessary to accomplish them. And hence he continues: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum, cum homines adjutorium gratiae non implorant; cum autem vocatione Divina intelligunt cui sit ingemiscendum, et invocant Eum, fiet quod sequitur: Ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia [The Law entered in so that the offence might abound, when men do not implore the help of grace; but when through the Divine Calling they understand to whom they must cry out, and invoke Him, then will follow what comes next: Where the offence abounded, grace superabounded]. Here one sees expressed, as Petavius says, the absence of abundant grace and, on the other hand, the assistance of ordinary and common grace, by which one prays, and which the Saint here calls the Divine Calling.
Elsewhere he says: Hoc restat in ista mortali vita (that is, free will), non ut impleat homo justitiam, cum voluerit, sed ut se supplici pietate convertat ad Eum cujus dono eam possit implere (This remains in this mortal life — namely, free will — not that man may fulfill justice when he wills, but that he may turn with suppliant devotion to Him, by whose gift he can fulfill it). In saying, then, that man is powerless to observe the whole law, and that nothing else remains to him for obtaining the aid to satisfy it but the means of prayer, St. Augustine certainly supposes that the Lord gives to each one the grace of actually praying, without need of another extraordinary aid not common to all; otherwise, if this other special aid were lacking, nihil restaret arbitrio (nothing would remain to free will) to observe actually all the divine precepts, at least the more difficult ones. And in speaking thus, the Saint certainly cannot mean that sufficient grace gives only the power, but not the act, of praying; for as regards the power, it is certain that by sufficient grace it is given for every difficult work; therefore the holy Doctor certainly means (as he already teaches in another place) that easy things, such as praying, can well be actually performed by each one with sufficient grace, and the difficult things then with the aid that is obtained by means of prayer.
Above all, two texts of St. Augustine are to the purpose. The first is this: Certum est nos mandata servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab Illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo faciamus (It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we will as much as suffices, so that by willing we may act). The Saint says, then, that it is certain that we shall observe the precepts if we will; on the other hand, he says that in order to will to observe them, and to observe them in effect, we must pray. Therefore to all of us is given the grace of praying, and by praying of obtaining the abundant grace that makes us observe the precepts; otherwise, if for praying actually there were needed efficacious grace, which is not common to all, those to whom it were not given could neither observe the precepts nor have the will to observe them.
The second text is this, where the holy Doctor answers the monks of Adrumetum, who spoke thus: If grace is necessary, and without it I can do nothing, why correct me, who cannot act and have not the grace to do so? Pray rather to the Lord for me, that He may give me this grace — ora potius pro me (pray rather for me). And the Saint answers them: You must be corrected, not because you do not act for want of strength, but because you do not pray to obtain this strength: Qui corripi non vult (these are the Saint's words), et dicit, ora potius pro me; ideo est, ut faciat etiam ipse pro se, cioè ut oret etiam ipse pro se (He who does not wish to be corrected, and says, "Pray rather for me," is corrected for this reason: that he may also do it for himself — that is, that he may also pray for himself).
Now if the Saint had not believed that each one has the grace by which he prays, if he wills, without need of another aid, he could not have said that the man should be corrected because he did not pray, since the man could have replied: But if I am not to be corrected for not acting, since I have not the special grace to act, neither can I be corrected if I do not pray, when I have not the special grace of praying actually. St. Augustine writes the same in another place, saying: Non se fallant qui dicunt, ut quid nobis praecipitur, ut declinemus a malo, et faciamus bonum, si id velle, et operari Deus operatur in nobis? (Let them not deceive themselves who say, "Why is it commanded us to turn away from evil and to do good, if it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish?") And the Saint answers that men, when they do good, must give thanks for it to God, who gives them the strength to do it; but when they do not do it, they must pray in order to receive this strength which they have not:
Quando autem non agunt (these are his words), orent ut quod nondum habent accipiant (But when they do not act, let them pray that they may receive what they do not yet have). Now if these men did not even have the grace to pray actually, they could answer: Ut quid nobis praecipitur ut oremus, si orare Deus operatur in nobis? (Why is it commanded us to pray, if God Himself works prayer in us?) How are we to pray, if we do not receive the aid necessary to pray actually?
St. Thomas Aquinas does not speak expressly of prayer, but he supposes as certain what we assert, when he says: Hoc ad Divinam Providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem, dummodo ex parte ejus non impediatur (This belongs to Divine Providence: that He provide each one with the things necessary for salvation, so long as He is not hindered on man's part). If, then, it is held on the one hand that God gives to all the graces necessary for salvation, and on the other, that for praying the grace is necessary which supplies us with the power to pray actually, and by prayer the obtaining of the greater aid to do what we cannot do with the ordinary aid, we must necessarily say that God gives to all the sufficient grace of praying actually, if they will, without need of efficacious grace. Let us add here what Bellarmine says in answer to the heretics, who from the Savior's words, Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater meus traxerit eum (No one can come to Me unless My Father draw him), inferred that no one could go to God who was not properly drawn by Him: Respondemus (writes Bellarmine), eo solum concludi non habere omnes auxilium efficax, quo re ipsa credant; non tamen concludi non habere omnes saltem auxilium quo possint credere, vel certe quo possint auxilium petere (We answer that from this it only follows that not all have the efficacious aid whereby they actually believe; it does not, however, follow that not all have at least the aid whereby they can believe, or at least whereby they can ask for the aid).
Let us come now, thirdly and lastly, to see the reasons for this opinion. The most learned Petavius, with Duval and other theologians, asks thus: Why does God impose on us things that we cannot observe with the common and ordinary grace? Because (he answers) the Lord wills that we have recourse to Him by prayer, as the holy Fathers commonly say, as we have seen above. Hence he deduces that we must hold for certain that each one has the grace of praying actually, and by prayer of obtaining the greater aid to do what we cannot with the common grace; otherwise God would have imposed on us an impossible law. The reason is very strong. To it may be added that other reason: that if God commands all the actual observance of the precepts, it must necessarily be supposed that He also gives to all in common the grace necessary for their actual observance, at least mediately by means of prayer. In order, therefore, that the law be reasonable and the reproof just for him who does not observe it, each one must have the sufficient power — at least mediate, by means of prayer — to fulfill the precepts actually, and at times to pray, without need of another aid not common to all; otherwise, if this mediate — or remote — power of actually praying were lacking, it could not be said that each one has from God the sufficient grace to observe the law actually.
Thomassin and Tournely amass and assign many other reasons for this opinion; but all these I pass over, and I take hold of one reason that seems to me evident. This reason is founded on the precept of hope, by which we are all bound to hope with certainty for eternal life from God; and I say that if we were not certain that God gives to all the grace of being able to pray actually, without need of another particular grace not common to all, no one without a special revelation could hope for salvation as he ought. Permit me, therefore, first to set forth the foundations of this reason.
The virtue of hope is so dear to God that He has declared that He finds His delight in those who trust in Him: Beneplacitum est Domino... in eis, qui sperant in misericordia ejus (Ps. 146:11: The Lord is well pleased... with those who hope in His mercy). And
He promises victory over enemies, perseverance in His grace, and eternal glory to him who hopes, and because he hopes: Quoniam in me speravit, liberabo eum, protegam eum... eripiam eum, et glorificabo eum (Ps. 90:14: Because he has hoped in Me, I will deliver him; I will protect him... I will rescue him and glorify him). Salvabit eos, quia speraverunt (Ps. 36:40: He will save them, because they have hoped). Conserva me, quoniam speravi in te (Ps. 15:1: Preserve me, for I have hoped in You). Nullus speravit in Domino, et confusus est (Sir. 2:11: No one has hoped in the Lord, and been confounded). And we are certain that heaven and earth will fail, but the words and the promises of God cannot fail: Caelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non pertransibunt (Matt. 24:35: Heaven and earth will pass away, but My words will not pass away). St. Bernard says, then, that all our merit consists in placing all our confidence in God: Hoc totum hominis meritum, si totam spem suam ponat in eo (This is the whole merit of man: if he places all his hope in Him). The reason is that he who hopes in God greatly honors Him: Invoca me in die tribulationis, eruam te, et honorificabis me (Ps. 49:15: Call upon Me in the day of tribulation; I will deliver you, and you shall honor Me). He honors the power, the mercy, and the fidelity of God, believing that God can and wills to save him, and cannot fail His promise to save whoever trusts in Him.
And the Prophet assures us that the greater our confidence, the more abundantly will the Divine Mercy pour itself out upon us: Fiat Misericordia tua super nos, quemadmodum speravimus in te (Ps. 32:22: Let Your mercy be upon us, even as we have hoped in You).
Now this virtue of hope, because it is so pleasing to the Lord, He has willed to impose upon us by a grave precept, as the theologians commonly say, and as appears from many passages of Scripture: Sperate in eum omnis congregatio populi (Ps. 61:9: Hope in Him, all you congregation of the people). Qui timetis Dominum, sperate in Illum (Sir. 2:9: You who fear the Lord, hope in Him). Spera in Deo tuo (Hos. 12:6: Hope in your God). Sperate in eam, quae vobis offertur gratiam (1 Pet. 1:13: Hope in that grace which is offered to you). This hope of eternal life, moreover, must be in us firm and certain, as St. Thomas Aquinas already defines it: Spes est certa exspectatio Beatitudinis (Hope is the certain expectation of beatitude). And the holy Council of Trent has also expressly declared it, saying: In Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent; Deus enim nisi ipsi illius Gratiae defuerint, sicut coepit opus bonum ita perficiet, operans velle et perficere (All must place and repose a most firm hope in the aid of God; for God, unless they themselves fail His grace, as He has begun the good work, so will He perfect it, working in them both to will and to accomplish). And before this St. Paul declared it, speaking of himself: Scio cui credidi, et certus sum, quia potens est depositum meum servare (2 Tim. 1:12: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep my deposit). And herein Christian hope differs from worldly hope; for worldly hope, in order to be hope, it is enough that it be an uncertain expectation; nor can it be otherwise, because it can always be doubted whether the man who has promised the gift has at present, or will afterwards change, the will to give it. But the Christian hope of eternal salvation is certain on God's part, since He can and wills to save us, and has promised salvation to whoever observes His law, promising also to this end the graces necessary for observing this law to whoever asks Him for them.
It is true that hope is still accompanied by fear, as St. Thomas Aquinas says; but this fear does not arise on God's part, but on ours, because we can always fail (by not corresponding as we ought) and put an obstacle to grace by our sins. Hence the Council of Trent rightly condemned the Innovators, who, because they altogether deprive man of free will, hold that every believer must have an infallible certainty of perseverance and of salvation. This is an error already condemned by the Council of Trent (Sess. 6, ch. 13, and Can. 15 and 16); because, as we have said, our correspondence is also necessary to obtain salvation, and this correspondence of ours is uncertain and fallible. Hence the Lord wills, on the one hand, that we should always fear ourselves, lest we fall into presumption by trusting in our own strength; but on the other hand He wills that we be certain of His good will and of His aid to save us, provided we ask Him for it, so that we may have a sure confidence in His goodness. St. Thomas Aquinas says that we must certainly expect eternal beatitude from God, trusting in His power and mercy, believing that God can and wills to save us: De potentia Dei, et misericordia Ejus certus est quicunque fidem habet (Whoever has faith is certain of the power and mercy of God).
Since, then, our hope of salvation in God must be certain (according to St. Thomas Aquinas, Certa exspectatio Beatitudinis — a certain expectation of beatitude), the motive for hoping must consequently be certain; otherwise, if the foundation of this hope were not certain but doubtful, we could not hope and certainly expect from God salvation and the means necessary for it. But St. Paul wills that we be altogether steadfast and immovable in hope if we would be saved: Si tamen permanetis in fide fundati, et stabiles et immobiles a spe Evangelii quod audistis (Col. 1:23: If yet you continue in the faith, grounded and steadfast and immovable from the hope of the Gospel which you have heard). And in another place he confirms it, saying that our hope must be immovable like a sure and firm anchor, since it is founded on the promises of God, who cannot lie: Cupimus autem unumquemque vestrum tandem ostentare solicitudinem ad expletionem spei usque in finem... ut per duas res immobiles, quibus impossibile est mentiri Deum, fortissimum solatium habeamus, qui confugimus ad tenendam propositam spem; quam sicut anchoram habemus animae tutam ac firmam (Heb. 6:11, 19: But we desire that every one of you show forth the same carefulness unto the fullness of hope even to the end... that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest comfort — we who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope set before us; which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm). Hence St. Bernard says that our hope cannot be uncertain, since it rests upon the divine promises: Neque enim vana nobis haec exspectatio, aut dubia spes videtur, innixi nimirum aeternae promissionibus Veritatis (For this expectation of ours does not seem vain, nor our hope doubtful, resting as we surely do upon the eternal promises of the Truth). And speaking of himself: in three things (he says in another place) does my hope consist — in the love with which God has adopted us as children, in the truth of His promise, and in His power to fulfill it: Tria considero, in quibus spes mea consistit: caritatem adoptionis, veritatem promissionis, potestatem redditionis (I consider three things in which my hope consists: the charity of the adoption, the truth of the promise, the power of its fulfillment).
And therefore the Apostle St. James wills that whoever desires the divine graces must ask God for them, not with hesitation but with a sure trust of obtaining them: Postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans (Jas. 1:6: But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering). Otherwise, he says, if he asks tossed about by hesitation, he will obtain nothing: Qui enim haesitat, similis est fluctui maris, qui a vento movetur, et circumfertur; non ergo aestimet homo ille, quod accipiet aliquid a Domino (Jas. 1:6, 8: For he who wavers is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind; therefore let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord). And St. Paul in this praises Abraham, because he in no way doubted the divine promise, knowing that when God promises He cannot fail: In repromissione etiam Dei non haesitavit diffidentia, sed confirmatus est fide, dans gloriam Deo; plenissime sciens, quia quaecumque promisit, potens est et facere (Rom. 4:20: In the promise also of God he staggered not through distrust, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God; most fully knowing that whatsoever He has promised, He is able also to perform). For this reason Jesus Christ also admonished us that we shall then receive all the graces we desire when we ask for them with a sure belief that we shall receive them: Propterea dico vobis, omnia quaecumque orantes petitis, credite quia accipietis, et evenient vobis (Mark 11:24: Therefore I say to you, all things whatsoever you ask when you pray, believe that you shall receive, and they shall come to you). In short, God does not will to hear us unless we believe with certainty that we shall be heard.
Now let us come to our point. Our hope of salvation, and of the means necessary for it, must therefore be certain in God on His part. The motives that ground this certainty, as we have seen, are the power, the mercy, and the fidelity of God; but among these motives the strongest and most certain is the infallible fidelity of God in the promise He has made us, through the merits of Jesus Christ, to save us and to give us the graces necessary to obtain salvation; for although we believe that God is of infinite power and mercy, nevertheless (as Juenin well observes) we could not hope with sure confidence for salvation from the Lord if He had not certainly promised it to us. But this promise is conditional — if we correspond by our works and if we pray — as appears from the divine Scriptures: Petite et accipietis (Ask, and you shall receive). Si quid petieritis Patrem in nomine meo, dabit vobis (If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it to you). Dabit bona petentibus se (He will give good things to those who ask Him). Oportet semper orare (We must always pray). Non habetis propter quod non postulatis (You have not, because you ask not). Si quis indiget sapientia, postulet a Deo (If any of you lacks wisdom, let him ask of God). And from many other similar texts which we have cited above. For this reason the holy Fathers and the theologians commonly say — as we proved in Chapter I of Part One — that prayer is a necessary means of salvation.
Now if we were not certain that God gives to all the grace of being able to pray actually, without need of another special grace not common to everyone, we could not have a certain and stable foundation in God for certainly hoping for salvation, but only an uncertain and conditional one. When I am certain that by praying I shall obtain eternal life and all the graces necessary to obtain it, and I know that God will not refuse me (since He grants it to all) the grace of actually praying if I will, then I have a certain foundation for hoping for salvation from God, if I do not fail on my part.
But when I doubt whether God will give me or not the particular grace, which He does not give to all and which is necessary for actually praying, then I have no certain foundation in God for hoping for salvation, but only a doubtful and uncertain one, it being uncertain to me whether God will give me this special grace which I need in order to pray, since He denies it to many. And this uncertainty would then be not only on my part but also on God's part, and behold, Christian hope is then destroyed — the hope which, according to St. Paul, must be immovable, firm, and sure. I speak the truth: I do not know how the Christian could fulfill the precept of hope, hoping as he ought with sure confidence in God for salvation and the graces necessary for it, without holding it for certain that God commonly gives to everyone the grace of actually praying, if he wills, without need of another special aid.
So then, to conclude: with our system, or rather opinion (already held by so many theologians and by our little Congregation), there well agrees, on the one hand, intrinsically efficacious grace, by which we infallibly (though freely) do good; for it cannot be denied that God can indeed, by His omnipotence, incline and move human hearts to will freely what He wills, according to the Scriptures: Cor Regis in manu Dei est, et quocunque voluerit, inclinabit illud (Prov. 21:1: The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and whithersoever He wills, He shall incline it).
Spiritum meum ponam in medio vestri, et faciam ut in praeceptis meis ambuletis (Ezek. 36:28: I will put My spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in My precepts). Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet (Isa. 46:10: My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done). Qui immutat cor Principum populi terrae (Job 12:24: Who changes the heart of the princes of the people of the earth). Deus pacis... aptet vos in omni bono, ut faciatis ejus voluntatem; faciens in vobis quod placeat coram se per Jesum Christum (Heb. 13:21: The God of peace... fit you in every good thing, that you may do His will; working in you what is pleasing before Him through Jesus Christ). And it cannot be denied that St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas taught the opinion of the efficacy of grace of itself and by its nature. This appears from many of their texts, and especially from these which I here add. St. Augustine says: Qui tamen (scil. Deus) hoc non fecit, nisi per ipsorum hominum voluntates, sine dubio habens humanorum cordium inclinandorum omnipotentissimam potestatem (Yet He — namely God — did this only through the wills of those very men, doubtless possessing a most omnipotent power to incline human hearts). In another place: Agit onnipotens Deus in corde hominum, ut per eos agat, quod eos agere voluerit (The omnipotent God works in the heart of men, so as to work through them what He has willed them to do). In another: Etsi faciunt omnes bona, quae pertinent ad colendum Deum, Ipse facit, ut illi faciant quae praecipit (Even if all do the good things that pertain to the worship of God, it is He Himself who causes them to do what He commands). In another: Certum est nos facere, cum facimus, sed Ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit: Faciam, ut in justificationibus meis ambuletis (It is certain that we act when we act; but He causes us to act, supplying most efficacious strength to the will — He who said: I will cause you to walk in My statutes). In another, on the text of the Apostle: Deus est enim, qui operatur in nobis velle, et perficere pro bona voluntate (Phil. 2:13: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will), he says:
Nos ergo volumus, sed Deus in nobis operatur velle et perficere (We therefore will, but God works in us both to will and to accomplish). In another: Quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab Illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus; quantum sufficit, ut volendo faciamus (Because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we will as much as suffices, so that by willing we may act). In another: Novit (Deus) in cordibus ipsis operari, non ut homines nolentes credant, quod fieri non potest, sed ut volentes ex nolentibus fiant (He — God — knows how to work in hearts themselves, not that men should believe unwillingly, which cannot happen, but that from unwilling they should become willing). In another: Operatur in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates (He works in the hearts of men not only true revelations, but also good wills). In another: Tantum voluntates nostrae valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit (Our wills avail as much as God has willed them to avail). In another: Voluntates, quae conservant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in Dei potestate, ut eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, faciat inclinari (The wills, which preserve the creature of the world, are so in the power of God that He makes them incline whither He wills, when He wills). St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, then says in one place: Deus movet immutabiliter voluntatem propter efficaciam virtutis moventis, quae deficere non potest (God moves the will immutably, on account of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail). In another place: Caritas impeccabilitatem habet ex virtute Spiritus Sancti, qui infallibiliter operatur quodcunque voluerit; unde impossibile est haec duo simul esse vera, quod Spiritus Sanctus velit aliquem movere ad actum Caritatis, et quod ipse Caritatem amittat peccando (Charity has its sinlessness from the power of the Holy Spirit, who infallibly works whatsoever He wills; whence it is impossible that these two things should be true at once: that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he should lose charity by sinning). In another: Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid impossibile est poni, quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur (If God moves the will to something, it is impossible that the will should not be moved to it).
On the other hand, true sufficient grace, which is common to all, accords well with our opinion — grace to which and by which, if man corresponds, he will have efficacious grace; but on the contrary, if he does not correspond and resists, this efficacious grace will justly be denied him. And thus every excuse is taken away from those sinners who say that they have not the strength to overcome temptations; for if they prayed, according to the ordinary grace which is already given to everyone, they would obtain this strength, and would be saved. Otherwise, if this ordinary grace be not admitted, by which everyone can at least pray (without need of another special grace not common to all), and by praying obtain the greater aid to observe the law, I do not know how so many passages of the Sacred Scriptures can be understood, where souls are exhorted to return to God, to overcome temptations, and to correspond to the Divine calls: Praevaricatores redite ad cor (Isa. 46:8: Return, you transgressors, to the heart). Revertimini, et vivite (Ezek. 18:32: Return, and live). Convertimini, et agite poenitentiam (Ezek. 18:30: Be converted, and do penance). Solve vincula colli tui (Isa. 52:2: Loose the bonds of your neck). Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis, et onerati estis (Matt. 11:28: Come to Me, all you who labor and are burdened). Resistite fortes in fide (1 Pet. 5:9: Resist, strong in faith). Ambulate dum lucem habetis (John 12:35: Walk while you have the light). I do not know (I say), if it were ever true that the grace of praying was not given to all, and by prayer of obtaining the greater aid to attain salvation, how the aforesaid Scriptures could be understood, and how the sacred Orators can exhort with such force all universally to be converted, to resist the enemies, to walk in the way of the virtues, and, to achieve all this, to pray with confidence and perseverance — when the grace of acting well, or at least of praying, were not granted to everyone, but only to those to whom efficacious grace is given. And I do not know how the reproof could be just, which is made also universally to all sinners who resist grace and despise the Divine Voice: Vos semper Spiritui Sancto resistitis (Acts 7:51: You always resist the Holy Spirit). Quia vocavi, et renuistis; extendi manum meam, et non fuit qui aspiceret; despexistis omne consilium meum, et increpationes meas neglexistis (Prov. 1:24: Because I called, and you refused; I stretched out My hand, and there was none that regarded; you despised all My counsel, and neglected My reproofs). If even the remote but efficacious grace of prayer had been wanting to them — which our opponents already suppose necessary to pray actually — I do not know (I say) how all this could be reproached to them.
I conclude. Someone perhaps, as I think, would have wished me to have treated more at length, and examined distinctly in this work, the great and so controverted point of wherein the efficacy of grace consists, according to the many different systems taught today by theologians: of physical premotion, of congruous grace, of concomitant grace, of relatively victorious delectation by superiority of degrees. But to do this a little book would not have sufficed, which I have deliberately tried to make small, so that it might be more easily read. To set myself to traverse so vast a sea, several volumes would have been needed; but this labor has already been sufficiently done by others; and besides, this was not my intent. I wished, moreover, to establish the point proposed in this second part, for the honor of the Divine Providence and Goodness, in order to help sinners, so that they may not abandon themselves to despair, believing themselves destitute of grace; and also in order to take away from them every excuse, if they say that they have not the strength to resist the assaults of sense and of hell; having shown them that none of those who are damned is damned on account of the original sin of Adam, but only through his own fault, since God denies to no one the grace of prayer, by which is obtained from God the aid to conquer every concupiscence and every temptation.
For the rest, my principal intent has been to recommend to all the use of this most powerful and necessary means of prayer, so that each one may apply himself to it with greater diligence and greater courage, if he desires to be saved; while for this reason so many poor souls lose the Divine Grace and continue to live in sin, and in the end are lost, because they do not pray and do not have recourse to God for help. The worst is (I cannot help repeating it) that few preachers and few confessors purposely strive to instill in their hearers and penitents the use of prayer, without which it is impossible to observe the divine precepts and to obtain perseverance in the divine grace.
Having observed the absolute necessity of praying which all the divine Scriptures impose — Scriptures with which the Old as well as the New Testament are filled — I have procured that there be introduced into the Missions of our Congregation, as has been practiced for many years, that the Sermon on Prayer always be preached; and I say, and repeat, and shall always repeat as long as I live, that our whole salvation lies in praying, and that therefore all writers in their books, all sacred Orators in their sermons, all confessors in administering the Sacrament of Penance should inculcate nothing more than this: to pray always — always admonishing, exclaiming, and continually repeating: Pray, pray, and never cease to pray; for if you pray, your salvation will be certain, but if you cease to pray, your damnation will be certain. Thus should all preachers and directors do, since according to the opinion of every Catholic school — no school places this truth in doubt — he who prays obtains graces and is saved; but too few are those who practice it, and for this reason so few are saved.
c Le Moyne Disp. de Dono or. an. 1650. contra Arnald.
u Baucat. Theol. Patr. Diss. 3. Sect. 4. pag. 141. ad 146.
aa Sotus de Nat. et Grat. lib. I. cap. 15.
ab Felicius Dist. 24. cap. 29.
ac Vega lib. 13. cap. 13.
ad Gotti Tom. 2. tract. 6. de Grat. quaest. I. § 3. num. 19. pag. 332.
ae S. Franc. Sal. tom. 2. lib. 3. cap. 4.
af Bellarm. t. 4. Contr. 3. de Grat. lib. 2. c. 5.
ag S. Th. lect. I. in c. I. Ep. I. ad Cor.
ah Bell. de Grat. l. 2. c. 5.
ai S. Aug. de Nat. et Grat. cap. 44. n. 50.
al S. Aug. de Nat. et Grat. cap. 69.
am S. Aug. lib. de Div. quaest. ad Sempl. qu. 2. n. 21.
an Card. Sfondrat. Notus Praed. P. 1. § 2. n. 31. pag. 105.
ao Card. de Noris Jans. err. cal. subl. vide c. 2. § 1. pag. 129.
ap S. Aug. Ep. ad sist. 194. alias 105.
aq S. Bas. lib. Mor. summar. Sum. 62. cap. 3.
ar S. Chrysost. in cap. 3. ad Gal. vers. 22.
as Idem Hom. de Moyse.
at S. Bern. Serm. 5 de Quadrag.
au S. August....
av Idem lib. 3 de lib. arb. cap. 19. n. 53.
az Idem lib. I ad Simlic. qu. 2.
ax Idem tract. 26. in Joan. num. 2.
ay Idem eod. tit. cap. 22. n. 65.
ba S. Aug. de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 10. n. 31. in fin.
bb Idem de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 18.
bc Idem in Epist. 89.
bd S. Aug. in Ep. 89. c. 43. et lib. de Div. Quaest. ad Simpl. q. 1. n. 14.
be S. Aug. de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 16.
bf Idem lib. de Corrept. et Grat. cap. 5.
bg S. Aug. eod. tit. cap. 2. n. 4.
bh S. Thom. de Verit. q. 14. art. 11. ad I.
bi Bellarm. lib. 2. de Grat. cap. 8.
bl S. Bern. Serm. 15. in psal. 90.
bm S. Th. 2. 2. q. 18. art. 4.
bn S. Th. 2. 2. q. 18. a. 4.
bo S. Th. 2. 2. q. 18. a. 4. ad 2.
bp S. Bern. Serm. 8. in Ps. 90. num. 1.
bq Idem Serm. 3. Dom. 6. Post. Pent. n. 6.
br S. Aug. de Corrept. et Grat. cap. 14. n. 43.
bs Idem de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 10.
bt Idem de Praedest. Ss. cap. 10.
bu Idem de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 16.
bv Idem de Dono Persev. cap. 13.
bz S. Aug. de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 16.
bx Idem lib. 1. ad Bonif. cap. 19. n. 38.
by Idem de Grat. Christi cap. 24. n. 25.
ca Idem de Civit. Dei cap. 9.
cb Idem de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 20.
cc S. Thom. de malo quaest. 6.
cd Idem 2. 2. quaest. 24. a. 11.
ce Idem 1. 2. quaest. 10. a. 4. ad 3.