Chapter II — Second preliminary

God commonly gives the necessary grace to all the just to observe the commandments, and to all sinners to be converted

If, then, God wills all to be saved, He consequently gives to all the grace and the aids necessary to attain salvation; otherwise it could not be said that He has a true will to save all. "Antecedentis voluntatis (says St. Thomas Aquinas), qua Deus vult omnium salutem, effectus est ordo naturae in finem salutis, et promoventia in finem omnibus communiter proposita, tam naturalia, quam gratuita" ("By the antecedent will, whereby God wills the salvation of all, the effect is the ordering of nature to the end of salvation, and the means of advancing to that end set before all in common, both natural and gratuitous"). And it is certain, against what Luther and Calvin blasphemed, that God does not impose a law impossible to observe. On the contrary, it is certain that without the help of grace the observance of the law is impossible, as Innocent I declared against the Pelagians, saying: "Necesse est ut quo (scil. Deo) auxiliante vincimus, Eo non adjuvante vincamur" ("It must needs be that we conquer when He [scil. God] helps us, and that we are conquered when He does not help"). And Pope Celestine declared the same. Therefore, if the Lord gives to all a law that can be observed, He consequently also gives to all the grace necessary to observe it, either immediately or mediately by means of prayer, as the holy Council of Trent has declared all too clearly: "Deus impossibilia non jubet sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis" ("God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding He admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and He helps you so that you may be able") (Sess. 6, ch. 13). Otherwise, if God denied us grace, both proximate and remote, to fulfill the law, either the law would have been given in vain, or sin would be necessary — and, being necessary, it would no longer be sin, as we shall show at length below.

This is the common teaching of the Fathers. Let us see it. St. Cyril of Alexandria says: "Quod si (quis) perinde, atque alii, et ex aequo, cum ipsis Divinae gratiae opibus praeditus propria voluntate delapsus est; quomodo non eum servasse dicitur Christus, qui, quantum ad cavendi peccati auxila concessa pertinet, hominem liberavit?" ("But if anyone, endowed equally with others and on the same footing as they with the resources of divine grace, has fallen by his own will, how is it not said that Christ saved him, since, as far as concerns the helps granted for avoiding sin, He delivered the man?"). How (says the Saint) can that sinner, who received the aids of grace equally with the others who remained faithful, and who chose to sin of his own accord, then complain of Jesus Christ, who on His part had already delivered him by means of the aids granted him? St. John Chrysostom asks: "Unde nam alii vasa irae, alii misericordiae sunt?" ("Whence is it that some are vessels of wrath, others of mercy?"). And he answers: "Ex libera sua utique voluntate; nam Deus cum sit valde bonus in utrisque parem benignitatem ostendit" ("From their own free will, surely; for God, being exceedingly good, shows equal kindness to both"). Then, speaking of Pharaoh, who in Scripture is called hardened of heart, he adds: "Si salutem Pharao non est adeptus, totum id illius voluntati tribuendum est, cum nihil minus, quam qui salutem assecuti sunt, concessum illi fuerit" ("If Pharaoh did not attain salvation, the whole must be attributed to his will, since nothing less was granted to him than to those who attained salvation"). And in another place, speaking of the request of the mother of Zebedee's sons concerning the words "Non est meum dare vobis" ("It is not Mine to give you") etc., he says thus: "Hoc Illum (sc. Christum) significare voluisse, non suum esse tantummodo dare, sed et certantium esse capere; nam si istud ex Se uno penderet, omnes utique salvi essent Homines" ("By this He [scil. Christ] meant that it was not His alone to give, but belonged also to those who strive to win it; for if it depended on Him alone, all men would surely be saved"). St. Isidore of Pelusium: "Etenim serto, et modis omnibus (Deus) vult eos adjuvare, qui in vitio volutantur, ut excusationem eripiat" ("For certainly, and in every way, God wills to help those who are wallowing in vice, so as to take away their excuse"). St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "Ad aeternae vitae januam (Dominus) aperuit, ut omnes ea, quantum in ipso est, nullo impediente potiantur" ("The Lord has opened the gate of eternal life, so that all, as far as in Him lies, may enter it with none to hinder").

But the doctrine of these Greek Fathers does not please Jansenius, who has the temerity to say that the Greek Fathers have spoken most imperfectly of grace: "Nulli imperfectius de Gratia quam Graeci locuti sunt" ("None have spoken more imperfectly about grace than the Greeks"). Therefore, in the matter of grace, are we not to follow the teachings of the Greek Fathers, who were the first Teachers and Pillars of the Church? Was the doctrine of the Greeks, especially in so important a matter, perhaps different from that of the Latin Church? — when, on the contrary, it is certain that the true doctrine of the faith passed from the Greek Church to the Latin; hence, as St. Augustine wrote against Julian, who set against him the authority of the Greek Fathers, it cannot be doubted that the faith of the Latins is the same as that of the Greeks. And whom, pray, are we to follow? His errors, perchance, already condemned by the Church as heretical — he who had the audacity to say that even the just lack the grace which would render some commandments possible to them, and that man merits and demerits even when he acts by necessity, provided he is not forced by violence? These and his other errors spring from his utterly false system of relatively victorious delectation, which will be dealt with at length in refuting it in Chapter III.

But since the Greek Fathers do not satisfy Jansenius, let us see what the Latins say. Yet these differ in nothing from the Greeks. St. Jerome says: "Nihil boni operis (Homo) agere potest absque Eo, qui ita concessit liberum arbitrium, ut suam per singula opera gratiam non negaret" ("Man can do no good work without Him who so granted free will that He did not refuse His grace for each single work"). Note: "per singula opera gratiam non negaret" ("He did not refuse His grace for each single work"). St. Ambrose: "Quia enim venit, et januam pulsat, vult semper intrare, sed in nobis est quod non semper ingreditur" ("For since He comes and knocks at the door, He wills ever to enter; but it is in us that He does not always enter"). St. Leo: "Juste instat praecepto, qui praecurrit auxilio" ("He justly insists on the precept who runs ahead with His aid").

St. Hilary: "Nunc per unum in omnes donum justificationis gratia abundavit" ("Now through One the gift of justification has abounded in grace unto all"). Innocent I: "Quotidiana praestat (Homini) remedia, quibus nisi freti nitamur, nequaquam humanos vincere poterimus errores" ("He daily offers man remedies; unless we strive in reliance upon them, we shall never be able to overcome human errors").

St. Augustine: "Non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras. Neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod (nota) volentem sanare contemnis, ista tua propria peccata sunt: nulli enim homini ablatum est scire utiliter quaerere" ("It is not imputed to you as a fault that you are ignorant against your will, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know; nor that you do not bind up your wounded members, but that (note) you despise Him who wills to heal you: these are your own sins; for no man has been deprived of knowing how to seek profitably"). In another place: "Quod ergo ignorat (Anima) quid sibi agendum sit, ex eo est quod nondum accepit, sed hoc quoque accipiet, si hoc quod accepit bene usa fuerit: accepit autem, ut pie ac diligenter quaerat, si volet" ("That the soul does not know what it must do comes from its not yet having received; but it will receive this too, if it makes good use of what it has received; for it has received to seek devoutly and diligently, if it wills"). Note: "accepit autem, ut pie ac diligenter quaerat" ("it has received, that it may seek devoutly and diligently"). So that everyone receives at least the remote grace to seek, of which if he makes good use he will then receive the proximate grace to do what before he could not do. And the holy Doctor grounds all this on the principle that no one sins in what he cannot avoid; therefore (he adds), if man sins in anything, he sins insofar as he could have avoided it with the grace of the Lord, which is lacking to no one: "Neminem peccare in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest. Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest, sed opitulante Illo, qui non potest falli" ("No one sins in that which can in no way be avoided. But sin is committed; therefore it can be avoided, but with the aid of Him who cannot be deceived"). Evident reasoning, by which it becomes clear (as we shall examine more fully below, when speaking of the sins of the obstinate) that if the grace necessary to observe the commandments were lacking, there would be no sin.

St. Thomas Aquinas teaches the same in several places. In one place, explaining the text of the Apostle, "Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri" ("who wills all men to be saved"), he says: "Et ideo gratia nulli deest, sed omnibus (quantum in se est) se communicat, sicut nec sol deest oculis caecis" ("And therefore grace is lacking to no one, but communicates itself to all (as far as in it lies), just as the sun is not lacking to the eyes of the blind"). So that, just as the sun spreads its light to all, and only those are deprived of it who voluntarily blind themselves, so God communicates grace to all for observing the law, and men are lost only because they will not avail themselves of it. In another place: "Hoc ad Divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem, dummodo ex parte ejus (scilicet hominis) non impediatur" ("It pertains to divine providence to provide each one with the things necessary for salvation, provided it is not hindered on his part [scil. the man's]"). If, then, God gives to all the graces necessary for salvation, since actual grace is necessary to overcome temptations and to observe the commandments, it must necessarily be concluded that He gives to all actual grace to do good, either immediately or mediately, but without need of another grace to put into effect the means (such as prayer) in order to obtain proximate actual grace. In another place, on those words of St. John, "Nemo venit ad me" ("No one comes to Me") etc., he says: "Si non elevatur (cor humanum), non est defectus ex parte Trahentis, qui quantum in Se est non deficit, sed est propter impedimentum ejus qui trahitur" ("If the human heart is not lifted up, the defect is not on the part of the One drawing it, who as far as in Him lies does not fail, but is due to the impediment of the one being drawn"). Scotus says the same: "Vult omnes homines salvare, quantum est ex parte sui, et voluntate sua antecedente, pro qua dedit eis dona communia sufficientia ad salutem" ("He wills to save all men, as far as depends on Him and by His antecedent will, for which He gave them common gifts sufficient for salvation"). The Council of Cologne: "Quanquam nemo convertatur nisi tractus per Patrem, attamen nemo excusationem praetexat quod non trahatur; Ille semper stat ante ostium pulsans per internum et externum verbum" ("Although no one is converted unless drawn by the Father, yet let no one plead the excuse that he is not drawn; He ever stands before the door, knocking through the inward and the outward word").

Nor have the holy Fathers spoken at random, but on the foundation of the divine Scriptures, for the Lord in so many places most clearly assures us that He does not fail to assist us with His grace, if we will avail ourselves of it to persevere once justified, or to be converted if we are sinners: "Sto ad ostium et pulso, si quis mihi aperuerit, intrabo" ("Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens to Me, I will come in") (Rev. 3:20). Bellarmine argues well on this text, saying that the Lord, knowing already that man cannot open without His grace, would knock in vain at the door of his heart if He had not first conferred on him the grace to open when he wills. And this is precisely what St. Thomas Aquinas taught in explaining the same text; he said that God gives to each one the grace necessary for salvation, that he may correspond if he wills: "Deus voluntate sua liberalissima dat eam (scil. gratiam) omni praeparanti se (Apoc. 3. Ecce sto ad ostium, et pulso). Et ideo gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus, quantum in se est, se communicat" ("God by His most liberal will gives it [scil. grace] to everyone who prepares himself (Rev. 3: Behold, I stand at the door and knock). And therefore the grace of God is lacking to no one, but communicates itself to all, as far as in it lies"). Adding in another place: "Hoc ad Divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem" ("It pertains to divine providence to provide each one with the things necessary for salvation").

So that, as St. Ambrose wrote, the Lord knocks at the door because He truly wills to enter; yet He does not enter, or does not abide in our souls, because we hinder His entrance, or, once He has entered, we drive Him out: Quia enim venit, et januam pulsat, vult semper intrare; sed in nobis est quod non semper ingreditur, non semper manet (For since He comes and knocks at the door, He wills always to enter; but it lies with us that He does not always enter, nor always remain).

Quid est quod debui ultra facere vineae meae, et non feci? An expectavi ut faceret uvas, et fecit labruscas? (Isa. 5:4: What is there that I ought to have done more to My vineyard, and have not done? Did I look for it to bring forth grapes, and it has brought forth wild grapes?) Bellarmine says on this passage: Si non dedisset facultatem ad faciendas uvas, quorsum diceret Dominus, Expectavi? (If He had not given the faculty of producing grapes, to what purpose would the Lord say, I looked for it?) And if God did not give to all the grace necessary to be saved, He could not have said to the Jews: Quid debui ultra facere? (What more ought I to have done?) for they could have answered that they bore no fruit only because the help necessary for it was lacking to them. Bellarmine says the same in the place cited on those words of Jesus Christ: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos... et noluisti? (Matt. 23:38: How often would I have gathered your children... and you would not?) Quomodo voluit (asks the aforesaid Cardinal) ut quaeratur a nolentibus, si eos non juvit ut possint velle? (How did He will that fruit should be sought from those unwilling, if He did not assist them so that they could will?)

Suscepimus Deus misericordiam tuam in medio templi tui (Ps. 47:10: We have received Your mercy, O God, in the midst of Your temple). St. Bernard comments: In medio enim Templi misericordia est, non in angulo aut diversorio, quia non est personarum acceptio apud Deum; in communi posita est, offertur omnibus, et nemo illius expers, nisi qui renuit (For mercy is in the midst of the Temple, not in a corner or a private chamber, because there is no respect of persons with God; it is placed in the common place, it is offered to all, and no one is without a share in it, except him who refuses it).

An divitias bonitatis ejus... contemnis? ignoras quia benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit? (Rom. 2:4: Or do you despise the riches of His goodness...? Do you not know that the kindness of God leads you to penance?) Behold, the sinner through his own malice does not convert, despising the riches of the Divine Goodness that calls him and never ceases to move him by His grace to conversion. God hates sin, but at the same time He never ceases to love the sinful soul, while she lives on this earth, by giving her the help necessary to be saved. Parcis autem omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui amas animas (Wis. 11:28: But You spare all, because they are Yours, O Lord, who love souls). From this it is seen, says Bellarmine, that God does not deny the grace of resisting temptations to any sinner, however obstinate and blinded he may be: Auxilium ad novum peccatum vitandum semper omnibus adest vel immediate, vel mediate (that is, by means of prayer), quo possint a Deo majora praesidia impetrare, quibus adjuti peccata vitabunt (The help for avoiding a new sin is always at hand for all, either immediately or mediately — that is, by means of prayer — whereby they can obtain from God greater aids, assisted by which they will avoid sins). To this also pertains what the Lord says through Ezekiel: Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua, et vivat (Ezek. 33:11: As I live, says the Lord God, I will not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live). St. Peter says the same: Patienter agit propter vos, nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poenitentiam reverti (2 Pet. 3:9: He deals patiently for your sakes, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance). If therefore God wills that all should actually be converted, it must necessarily be supposed that He gives all the grace they need in order actually to be converted.

I well know there are theologians who maintain that God denies even sufficient grace to certain obstinate sinners; and among other things they avail themselves of a doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, who says: Quamvis autem illi, qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam potestatem, quin impedimentum gratiae praestent vel ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur, nihilominus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hic defectus ex culpa praecedente in eis relinquitur, sicut ebrius ab homicidio non excusatur, quod per ebrietatem committit, quam sua culpa incurrit. Praeterea, licet ille qui est in peccato, non habeat hoc in propria potestate, quod omnino vitet peccatum, habet tamen potestatem nunc vitare hoc vel illud peccatum, ut dictum est; unde quodcunque committit, voluntarie committit, et ita non immerito sibi imputatur ad culpam (Yet although those who are in sin cannot, by their own power, avoid placing an impediment to grace, as has been shown, unless they are prevented by the help of grace, nevertheless this is imputed to them as fault, because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault, just as a drunkard is not excused from the homicide which he commits through drunkenness, which he incurred by his own fault. Moreover, although he who is in sin has it not in his own power to avoid sin altogether, yet he has power now to avoid this or that sin, as has been said; wherefore whatever he commits, he commits voluntarily, and thus it is not undeservedly imputed to him as fault). From this they will have it that the Saint means to say that some sinners can indeed avoid sins in particular, but not all sins, because in punishment for the sins previously committed they are deprived of all actual grace.

But we answer that in this place St. Thomas is not speaking of actual grace, but of habitual, that is, sanctifying grace, without which the sinner cannot keep himself for a long time from falling into new sins, as he teaches in many places. And that he means the same in the passage quoted above is clearly seen from the context of the words he premises there, and which must be set down more at length in order to understand the true mind of the Saint. First of all, the title of the cited Chapter 160 is this: Quod homo in peccato exsistens sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest (That man, being in sin without grace, cannot avoid sin). Behold, the very title makes clear that the holy Doctor means nothing other than the same thing he has said in the other places cited.

Then in the cited place he says thus: Cum enim mens hominis a statu rectitudinis declinaverit, manifestum est quod recessit ab ordine debiti finis... Quandocunque igitur aliquid occurrerit conveniens inordinato fini, repugnans fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur ad debitum ordinem ut finem debitum omnibus praeferat, quod est gratiae effectus. Dum autem eligitur aliquid quod repugnat ultimo fini, impedimentum praestat gratiae quae dirigit in finem: unde ab omni peccato, antequam pergratiam ad debitum ordinem manifestum est quod post peccatum non potest homo abstinere reducatur... Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant, hominem in peccato existentem sine gratia posse vitare peccatum (For when the mind of man has declined from the state of rectitude, it is manifest that it has withdrawn from the order of the due end... Whenever, therefore, something occurs that is suited to the inordinate end but repugnant to the due end, it will be chosen, unless it be brought back to the due order so as to prefer the due end to all things, which is the effect of grace. But when something is chosen that is repugnant to the last end, it places an impediment to the grace that directs to the end: whence it is manifest that after sin man cannot abstain from every sin before he is brought back through grace to the due order... Whence appears the foolish opinion of the Pelagians, who said that man, being in sin, could avoid sin without grace). And immediately afterwards he writes the words already reported above, Quamvis autem illi etc. (Yet although those, etc.), of which the opponents make use. So that in the first place the intention of St. Thomas is not to prove that some sinners are deprived of all actual grace, and that nevertheless, though unable to avoid every sin, they still sin and are deserving of punishment; but his intention is to prove, against the Pelagians, that man, while he is without sanctifying grace, cannot abstain from sinning. And it is already clear that the Saint here certainly speaks of sanctifying grace, since this alone is what restores the soul to the right order. Now of this same sanctifying grace he means to speak when he says afterwards, Nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur (Unless they are prevented by the help of grace); meaning that if the sinner is not prevented, that is, is not first informed by grace and brought back into the right order of holding God for his last end, he cannot avoid committing new sins. And so the Thomists understand it, as does Ferrariensis in the said place, and Gonet in expounding this same place. But without having recourse to others, this becomes evident from what the same St. Thomas says in the Summa, where he speaks of the same point, and puts forward identically the same arguments, with the same words that he wrote in the book Contra Gentes in the cited Chapter 160; and there he expressly speaks only of habitual, that is, sanctifying grace.

And it could not be that the holy Doctor meant otherwise, since on the one hand he teaches elsewhere that the Divine Grace is never lacking to anyone, as he says in commenting on St. John: Sed ne credas effectum ipsum esse ex remotione verae lucis, hoc excludens Evangelista subdit: Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem. Illuminat scilicet Verbum, quantum de se est, quia ex parte sua nulli deest, imo vult omnes homines salvos fieri Quod si aliquis non illuminatur, ex parte hominis est avertentis se a lumine illuminante (But lest you believe that this effect itself comes from the removal of the true light, the Evangelist, excluding this, adds: He was the true light, which enlightens every man. Namely, the Word enlightens, as far as in Him lies, because on His part He is lacking to no one; nay, He wills all men to be saved. But if anyone is not enlightened, it is on the part of the man who turns himself away from the light that enlightens). And on the other hand he teaches that there is no sinner so lost and abandoned by grace that he cannot lay aside his obstinacy and unite himself to the Divine Will, which he certainly cannot do without the help of grace: In statu viae nullus est qui mentis obstinationem non possit reponere, et sic Divinae voluntati conformari (In the state of this present life there is no one who cannot put away the obstinacy of his mind, and so conform himself to the Divine Will). Elsewhere he says: Quandiu manet homini usus liberi arbitrii in hac vita... potest se praeparare ad gratiam de peccatis dolendo (As long as the use of free will remains to man in this life... he can prepare himself for grace by grieving over his sins). To repent of one's sins cannot be done without grace. Elsewhere he says: Aliquis homo in statu viae non potest esse ita obstinatus in malo, quin ad suam liberationem cooperari possit (A man in the state of this present life cannot be so obstinate in evil that he cannot cooperate in his own deliverance). To cooperate necessarily implies that the help of grace is present. Elsewhere, on the words of St. Paul, Vult omnes salvos fieri (He wills all men to be saved), he says: Ideo gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus quantum in se est se communicat (Therefore the grace of God is lacking to no one, but communicates itself to all, as far as in it lies). Elsewhere, on the same words of the Apostle, Vult omnes etc. (He wills all, etc.), he says: Deus quantum in se est, paratus est omnibus dare gratiam. Illi ergo soli gratia privantur, qui in seipsis gratiae impedimentum praestant; et ideo excusari non possunt, si peccent (God, as far as in Him lies, is ready to give grace to all. They alone, therefore, are deprived of grace who place in themselves an impediment to grace; and therefore they cannot be excused if they sin).

And when the Saint says, Paratus est omnibus dare gratiam (He is ready to give grace to all), he does not intend to speak of actual grace, as we have seen above, but of sanctifying grace alone. Hence Cardinal Gotti rightly refutes those who say that God keeps the aids sufficient for salvation prepared and at hand, but in fact does not give them to all. Of what use would it be to the sick man (says this learned Author) if the Physician merely kept the remedies ready at hand, but then refused to apply them to him? Therefore, speaking to our point, he concludes that it must necessarily be said: Deus nedum offerre, sed etiam conferre singulis hominibus, et infidelibus, et induratis auxilia sufficientia, vel proxima, vel saltem remota, ad observanda praecepta (God not only offers, but also bestows on every single man, even on unbelievers and the hardened, sufficient aids, whether proximate or at least remote, for observing the precepts). Moreover, St. Thomas Aquinas says that the only sins which cannot be blotted out by penance are those of the demons and of the damned; on the contrary: Dicere quod aliquod peccatum sit in hac vita, de quo quis poenitere non possit, erroneum est... quia per hoc derogaretur virtuti Gratiae (To say that there is any sin in this life of which one cannot repent is erroneous... because this would detract from the power of grace). If anyone lacked grace, he certainly could not repent. Besides, as we have already seen above, the same St. Thomas expressly teaches in several places, especially in his commentary on chapter 12 of St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, that, as far as He is concerned, God denies to no one the grace necessary for conversion, saying: Gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus quantum in se est, se communicat (The grace of God is wanting to no one; rather, as far as it is concerned, it communicates itself to all). Hence the learned Author of the Theology for the Use of the Seminary of Périgueux rightly asserts: Non nisi ergo calumniose S. Thomae inputari potest quod peccatores aliquos a Deo totaliter deseri docuerit (It can therefore only be calumniously imputed to St. Thomas that he taught that some sinners are totally abandoned by God). Speaking on this point, Cardinal Bellarmine wisely distinguishes and says that, as regards avoiding new sins, every sinner, at every time, has at least the mediate aid: Auxilium sufficiens ac necessarium ad vitanda peccata omnibus, et omni tempore, vel immediate vel mediate, a Divina benignitate praestatur (A sufficient and necessary aid for avoiding sins is provided by the divine goodness to all, at all times, either immediately or mediately)... Dicimus vel mediate, quoniam certum est aliquos non habere [sufficiens auxilium, quod possit immediate resistere tentatori, et evitare peccatum, tamen habere] auxilium, quo possint a Deo majora praesidia impetrare, quibus adjuti peccata vitabunt (We say "or mediately," because it is certain that some do not have [sufficient aid for immediately resisting the tempter and avoiding sin, yet have] the aid by which they can obtain from God still greater helps, assisted by which they will avoid sin).¹

As regards the grace of conversion, he says that it is not given to the sinner at every time, but that no one will ever be so abandoned that ut certo et absolute per omnem vitam destituatur auxilio Dei, ut de salute desperare possit (he is certainly and absolutely deprived of the help of God for his whole life, so that he could despair of salvation).

The Thomist theologians, his disciples, say the same. The most learned Fr. Dominic Soto says: Certo certior sum, quin vero et certissimos credo semper fuisse sanctos Doctores, qui fuerint hoc nomine digni, neminem unquam a Deo fuisse derelictum, in hac mortali vita (I am more than certain — indeed, I hold it most certain — that the holy Doctors who have been worthy of that name have always held that no one in this mortal life has ever been abandoned by God). And the reason is clear: if the sinner were utterly abandoned by grace, either his sins could no longer be imputed to him as faults, since he goes on sinning, or else he would remain bound to what he cannot fulfill; but it is an undoubted rule of St. Augustine that one never sins in that which cannot be avoided: Neminem peccare in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest (No one sins in that which can in no way be avoided). And this accords with what St. Paul says: Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet etiam cum tentatione proventum, ut possitis sustinere (But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above what you are able, but will with the temptation also make a way of escape, so that you may be able to bear it) (1 Cor. 10:13).

This proventum is to be understood as the divine aid that the Lord always gives to the tempted, so that they may resist the temptation, as St. Cyprian explains: Faciet cum tentatione facultatem evadendi (He will make with the temptation the means of escaping). And more clearly Primasius: Illud faciet provenire, quod poterimus sustinere; id est in tentatione roborabit gratiae praesidio, quo possitis eam sustinere (He will bring about that which we shall be able to bear; that is, in temptation He will strengthen us with the support of grace, so that you may be able to endure it). St. Augustine and St. Thomas go so far as to say that God would be unjust and cruel if He bound anyone to a precept he cannot observe.

St. Augustine says: Peccati reum tenere quenquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est (To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is the height of injustice). And St. Thomas then says: Deus non est magis crudelis quam homo; sed homini imputatur ad crudelitatem, si obliget aliquem per praeceptum ad id quod implere non possit; ergo de Deo nullatenus est aestimandum (God is not more cruel than man; but it is imputed to a man as cruelty if he obliges someone by a precept to what he cannot fulfill; therefore this must in no way be thought of God). The case is otherwise, the Saint says, when ex ejus negligentia est, quod gratiam non habet, per quam potest servare mandata (it is through his own negligence that he does not have the grace by which he can keep the commandments). This is properly understood when a man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, by which he can well obtain the proximate grace to observe the precept, according to what the Council of Trent teaches: Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis (God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding He admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and He helps you that you may be able) (Sess. 6, ch. 13).

What St. Augustine said in the passage cited — namely, that there is no sin in what cannot be avoided — he confirms in many other places. In one place he says: Sive autem iniquitas, sive justitia, si in potestate non esset, nullum praemium, nulla poena justa esset (Whether it be iniquity or justice, if it were not within our power, there would be no just reward, no just punishment). Elsewhere he says: Si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, nullum peccatum eorum tenere possumus (If, finally, no power of abstaining from their work is granted them, we can hold them guilty of no sin). Elsewhere he says: Dat quidem ille (Daemon) consilium, sed Deo auxiliante nostrum est eligere vel repudiare quod suggerit; et ideo cum per Dei adjutorium in potestate tua sit, quare non magis Deo, quam ipsi obtemperare deliberas? (He [the devil] indeed gives counsel, but with God's help it is ours to choose or to reject what he suggests; and therefore, since through God's aid it is in your power, why do you not resolve to obey God rather than him?). In another place he says: Ex eo igitur quod o non accepit, nullus reus est (Therefore no one is guilty for what he did not receive). In another: Nemo vituperatione dignus, qui id non facit, quod facere non potest (No one deserves blame who does not do what he cannot do). St. Jerome says the same: Nec ad virtutes, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio, nec corona est (We are drawn by necessity neither to virtues nor to vices; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither damnation nor crown). Tertullian: Non enim poneretur lex ei, qui, non habet obsequium debitum legi in sua potestate (For a law would not be imposed on one who does not have within his own power the obedience due to the law). Mark the Hermit: Occulta nobis opitulatur gratia;. verum in nobis situm est agere, vel non agere bonum pro potestate (Grace secretly comes to our aid; but it lies in us to do good or not to do it, as far as we are able). St. Irenaeus, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Chrysostom, and others say the same.

Nor is it an objection that St. Thomas says that grace is denied to some in punishment for original sin: Auxilium (Gratiae) quibuscunque datur, misericorditer datur; quibus autem non datur, ex justitia non datur in poenam praecedentis, aut saltem originalis peccati, ut Augustinus dicit (The aid of grace is given mercifully to whomever it is given; but to those to whom it is not given, it is withheld out of justice, in punishment for a preceding, or at least original, sin, as Augustine says).

For the most learned Cardinal Gotti answers well that St. Augustine and St. Thomas are speaking of actual proximate grace for fulfilling the precepts of faith and charity, which is in fact what St. Thomas treats of in the said passage; but they do not thereby mean to deny that the Lord gives to each one the interior grace by which he can at least mediately obtain the grace of faith and of salvation; for, as we have seen above, the aforementioned holy Doctors do not doubt that God grants to each one at least remote grace for fulfilling the precepts. To this may be added the authority of St. Prosper, who wrote: Adhibita semper est universis hominibus quaedam supernae mensura doctrinae, quae etsi parcioris gratiae fuit, sufficit tamen quibusdam ad remedium, omnibus ad testimonium (A certain measure of heavenly teaching has always been applied to all men, which, though it was of a more sparing grace, nevertheless suffices for some as a remedy, and for all as a testimony).

Nor could this be understood otherwise, because if it were ever true that some sinned while lacking even remote sufficient grace, on account of original sin being imputed to them as a fault, it would have to be said that in order to sin, the liberty of the will suffices which we interpretively had in Adam's sin; but this cannot be said, because it stands expressly condemned in Proposition I of Michael Baius, which says: Ad peccatum formale, et ad demerendum sufficit illa libertas, qua voluntarium ac liberum fuit in causa sua, peccato originali, et libertate Adami peccantis (For formal sin and for incurring demerit, that liberty suffices by which an act was voluntary and free in its cause — in original sin and in the liberty of Adam sinning). Against this proposition, what Cardinal Bellarmine wrote is well said: that to commit a personal sin distinct from Adam's sin there is needed a new exercise of liberty, and a liberty distinct from Adam's liberty; otherwise it is not a distinct sin — according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, who teaches: Ad peccatum personale requiritur potentia absoluta personalis (For a personal sin, an absolutely personal power is required). Moreover, with regard to the baptized, the Council of Trent has declared that nothing of damnation remains in them: In renatis nihil odit Deus, quia nihil est damnationis iis, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per Baptisma in mortem (In the reborn God hates nothing, because there is nothing of condemnation in those who have been truly buried with Christ through Baptism into death). And it adds that concupiscence is not left as a punishment, but ad agonem relicta est, quae nocere non consentientibus non valet (was left for the struggle, and cannot harm those who do not consent) (Sess. 5, in the Decree on Original Sin). The concupiscence left behind, on the contrary, would greatly harm man if, on account of it, God denied men even the remote grace to obtain salvation.

From all that has been said, several theologians conclude that to say God denies to some the aid sufficient for fulfilling the precepts would be contrary to the faith, since God would then be binding them to the impossible; so says Fr. Nugnez: Deus nunquam denegat auxilium sufficiens ad implenda praecepta, alias nullo pacto possent impleri; et sic rediret Lutheri haeresis, quod Deus obligavit hominem ad impossibile (God never denies the sufficient aid for fulfilling the precepts; otherwise they could in no way be fulfilled, and thus Luther's heresy would return — that God obliged man to the impossible). And elsewhere he says: Fidei est, ita ut oppositum sit haeresis manifesta, quod omnis homo, dum est in via, potest poenitentiam agere de peccatis (It is of faith — so much so that the opposite is manifest heresy — that every man, while he is on the way, can do penance for his sins). And Fr. Ledesma: Certum est secundum Fidem, quod non est peccatum, quod non est in hominis libera potestate (It is certain according to the faith that what is not within man's free power is not a sin).

Juvenin says that the sinner then makes himself guilty through the liberty of exercise, in voluntarily choosing this or that sin, even though he then necessarily sins, since the actual grace that would suffice to free him from every sin is wanting. But this doctrine — namely, that a fallen man sins, having no other liberty than that of choosing which sin he wishes to commit, yet being necessitated to sin — rightly horrifies the learned Monsignor de Saleon, Archbishop of Vienne in France, who in his book Jansenismus redivivus wrote thus: Quis patietur audire posse hominem lapsum absente gratia, non alia gaudere libertate, praeter eam qua cum necessitate ad peccandum potest unum prae alio eligere? (Who could bear to hear that a fallen man, grace being absent, can enjoy no other liberty than that whereby, with the necessity of sinning, he may choose one sin in preference to another?) Shall it then be said that a man condemned to death, who has no other liberty than that of choosing the iron, the poison, or the fire that must kill him, in choosing his own death dies voluntarily and freely? And how can sin be imputed as guilt to him who is necessitated to sin in one way or another? Proposition 67 of Baius was condemned, which said: Homo peccat etiam damnabiliter in eo quod necessario facit (Man sins even damnably in that which he does necessarily). Where is liberty, where there is the necessity of sinning? Jansenius answers that the liberty of will which we interpretatively had in the sin of Adam suffices for sinning. But this also was condemned in Proposition 1 of the same Baius: Ad peccatum formale, et ad demerendum, sufficit illa libertas, qua voluntarium ac liberum fuit in causa sua, peccato originali, et libertate Adami peccantis (For formal sin, and for demeriting, that liberty suffices whereby it was voluntary and free in its cause, in original sin and in the liberty of Adam sinning).

The opponents go on to say that the sinner abandoned by grace, although he cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, can nevertheless avoid each sin distributively, that is, speaking of them singly, per simplicem suspensionem seu negationem actus (by a simple suspension or negation of the act), as they say. But this cannot be admitted for several reasons. First, because when a vehement temptation urges, which requires great effort to resist, it cannot morally be overcome (as all theologians say) except with the help of grace, or else by taking hold of another opposing vicious passion; so that such a sinner, deprived of grace, would then be without remedy necessitated to sin in one way or another — which is horrifying to say, as has been said above. Secondly, when a great sinful concupiscence presses in a certain matter, there is not always — indeed, rarely — another disordered motive to the contrary that has such force as to induce man to abstain from consenting to it; wherefore, when this opposing motive is wanting, the sinner would then be necessitated to commit that particular evil to which he feels inclined. Thirdly, that abstaining from sin per simplicem negationem actus (by a simple negation of the act), as they say, can hardly be imagined in the negative precepts, but can have no place at all, as Tournely and Cardinal Gotti well observe, when some positive precept urges the fulfilling of some supernatural act, such as the acts of faith, of hope, of love, and of contrition; for since these acts are supernatural, the divine supernatural assistance is necessarily required to fulfill them. So that at least in such a case, grace being wanting, man would necessarily sin by not satisfying such a positive precept, even though he could not avoid the sin. But to assert this, says Father Bannez, is contrary to the faith: Quotiescunque aliquis peccat (these are his words), necesse est ut ille de facto receperit Divinam inspirationem. Haec conclusio asseritur a nobis certa secundum Fidem, quia nemo peccat, propter quod non facit, quod facere non potest, ut certum est secundum Fidem; sed homo cui nihil datum est, quam quod ad naturam humanam pertinet, non habet unde possit operari supra naturam, ergo non peccat non operando aliquid supernaturale (Whenever anyone sins, it is necessary that he has in fact received a divine inspiration. This conclusion is asserted by us as certain according to faith, because no one sins by reason of not doing what he cannot do, as is certain according to faith; but a man to whom nothing has been given beyond what pertains to human nature has not that wherewith he can act above nature; therefore he does not sin by not performing something supernatural).

Nor does it avail to say that if that sinner is deprived of grace, he is deprived of it through his own fault; and that therefore, although he is abandoned by grace, he still sins. For Cardinal Gotti answers this well, that the Lord can justly punish such a sinner for the faults previously committed, but not for the transgressions he will commit in the future with regard to those precepts which he can no longer fulfill. If a servant, says the aforesaid author, were sent to a place and through his own fault fell into a ditch, his master could indeed punish him for his negligence in falling, and also for the future fault of refusing to obey, if he gave him the means (such as a rope or a ladder) to get out of the ditch and he refused to avail himself of them; but supposing the master did not offer him the help to get out, he would be a tyrant if he wished to impose upon him that he should continue the journey, and punished him if he did not continue it. Hence he concludes: Cum ergo homo peccando in foveam lapsus impotens factus sit prosequendi iter ad aeternam salutem, esto ipsum possit ob talem culpam punire, et similiter si gratiam, qua fiat potens, oblatam respuet; sed si Deus ipsum in sua impotentia relinquere velit, non poterit nisi injuste obligare, ut viam percurrat, et nisi percurrat punire (Since, therefore, man, having fallen by sin into a ditch, has been made powerless to pursue the journey to eternal salvation, grant that He may punish him for such a fault, and likewise if he rejects the grace offered whereby he would be made able; but if God wills to leave him in his powerlessness, He could not, except unjustly, oblige him to traverse the way, and punish him if he did not traverse it).

They then object many texts of Scripture, where this divine abandonment seems to be declared: Excaeca cor populi hujus... ne forte videat, et convertatur, et sanem eum (Isa. 6:10: Blind the heart of this people... lest perhaps it see, and be converted, and I heal it). Curavimus Babylonem, et non est sanata, derelinquamus eam (Jer. 51:9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed; let us forsake her). Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum, et non intrent in justitiam tuam (Ps. 68:28: Add iniquity upon their iniquity, and let them not enter into Your justice). Propterea tradidit illos in passiones ignominiae (Rom. 1:26: Therefore He delivered them up to shameful passions). Ergo (Deus) cujus vult miseretur et quem vult indurat (Rom. 9:18: Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens). And other similar texts. But to all these passages it is commonly and easily answered that in the Sacred Scriptures the divine permissions are often called operations; hence, in order not to blaspheme with Calvin that God positively destines and determines some to sin, it must be said that He permits that some sinners, in punishment of their faults, be on the one hand assailed by vehement temptations (which is the punishment from which we pray the Lord in the Pater noster to deliver us with those words, Et ne nos inducas in tentationem [And lead us not into temptation]); and on the other hand that they remain morally abandoned in their sin; so that their conversion, and the resistance they could make to temptations, although it is not impossible and hopeless, nevertheless through their own fault and through the evil habits formed becomes very difficult, since, placed in such laxity of life, they will have only very weak and rare desires and impulses to resist their evil habits and to return to the way of salvation. And this is that imperfect obstinacy in which the sinner remains hardened, and of which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks, saying: Induratum esse eum, qui non de facili possit cooperari ad hoc quod exeat de peccato; et haec est obstinatio imperfecta quia aliquis potest esse obstinatus in statu viae, dum scilicet habet ita firmatam voluntatem in peccato, quod non surgunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles (He is hardened who cannot easily cooperate so as to come out of sin; and this is imperfect obstinacy, because one can be obstinate in the state of this present life, namely when he has his will so fixed in sin that movements to good do not arise except weak ones). On the one hand, the mind darkened; the will made hard to the divine inspirations and attached to the pleasures of the senses, so that it despises and loathes spiritual goods; the passions and the sensible appetites which, through the evil habits formed, dominate in the soul; on the other hand, the lights and the calls of God, which render themselves little efficacious to move her through the fault of the soul, because of the contempt and the evil use she has made of them — nay, she feels a certain aversion to them, not wishing to be disturbed in her sensual delights; all these things then constitute the moral abandonment in which the sinner, once placed, can with the greatest difficulty come out of his miserable state and bring himself to lead an ordered life.

To come out and pass at one stroke from such disorder to a state of salvation, an abundant and extraordinary grace would be needed; but God rarely grants this grace to such obstinate sinners. Sometimes He grants it to some, says St. Thomas Aquinas, choosing them as vessels of mercy, as St. Paul writes, in order to make known His goodness; but to others He justly denies it, and leaves them in their unhappy state, to show His justice and His power: Interdum (says St. Thomas Aquinas) ex abundantia bonitatis suae etiam eos qui impedimentum Gratiae praestant, auxilio suo praevenit, convertens eos etc. Et sicut non omnes caecos illuminat, nec omnes languidos sanat, ita non omnes qui Gratiam impediunt, auxilio suo praevenit ut convertantur... Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. 9:22): Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae preparavit in gloriam (Sometimes, out of the abundance of His goodness, He anticipates with His help even those who place an obstacle to grace, converting them, etc. And as He does not enlighten all the blind, nor heal all the sick, so He does not anticipate with His help all who impede grace, that they may be converted... Hence it is that the Apostle says (Rom. 9:22): God, willing to show His wrath and to make known His power, endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared for glory). Then the holy Doctor adds: Cum autem Deus hominum qui in eisdem peccatis detinentur, hos quidem praeveniens convertat, illos autem sustineat, sive permittat secundum ordinem rerum procedere, non est ratio inquirenda, quare hos convertat, et non illos. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. 9:21): An non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? (Since, however, God, of men who are held in the same sins, converts some by anticipating them, while He bears with or permits others to proceed according to the order of things, no reason is to be sought why He converts these and not those. Hence it is that the Apostle says (Rom. 9:21): Has not the potter power over the clay, to make from the same mass one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?)

We do not deny, therefore, in concluding this point, that there is a moral abandonment of certain obstinate sinners, so that their conversion is morally impossible, that is, extremely difficult. And this, moreover, may well suffice for the good aim of the opponents in defending their opinion, namely, to put a curb on evil-doers and to induce them to amend before they come to fall into so deplorable a state. But it is then cruelty (as the Petrocorensis rightly says) to wish to take away from them all hope and to close to them altogether the way of salvation, by holding them to have fallen into total abandonment, so that they remain deprived of every actual grace for avoiding new sins and for being converted, at least mediately, by means of prayer (which is denied to no one while he lives, as we shall demonstrate in the following chapter), through which they can then obtain the abundant aids to put themselves in a state of salvation; for the fear of total abandonment would not only induce them to despair, but would also lead them to abandon themselves still more to vice, believing themselves utterly destitute of grace, so that no hope would remain to them of avoiding eternal damnation.

b Innoc. I. In Epist. ad Conc. Carthag.

f Idem Homil. 33.

ha Jansen. tom. 3. l. 3. c. 1. de Gratia Christi.

o Innoc. I. Ep. ad Conc. Carth.

t Scotus I. Sent. Dist. 46. quaest. un. ad I. arg.

aa Bellarm. tom. 4. lib. I. cap. II.

ab S. Bern. Serm. in Purif. B. M. Virg.

ac Bellarm. tom. 4. contr. 3. lib. 2. cap. 8.

ad S. Thom. lib. contra Gentes cap. 160.

ae Idem quaest. 24. de Verit. artic. 12. et I. 2. q. 109. art. 8.

af S. Th. cit. lib. Contra Gentes cap. 160.

ag Gonet tom. 4. tract. 8. art. 6. § I.

ah S. Th. I. 2. q. 109. a. 8.

ai Idem in Joan. cap. I. Lect. 5. ad verba: Erat Lux.

al S. Thom. I. Sent. Dist. 48. q. I. a. 3. ad 2.

am Idem. In 4. Sent. Dist. 20. q. I. a. I. qu. I.

an Idem in cap. 12. ad Hebr. Lect. 3.

ao Idem Lib. 3. contra Gentes c. 159.

ap Idem ibid. in fin.

aq Card. Gotti tom. I. Theol. tract. 5. q. 2. D. 3. § 2. n. 8.

ar S. Thom. 3. p. q. 86. a. I.

as Petroc. tom. I. cap. quaest. 4.

at Bellarm. Tom. 4. Controv. 3. l. 2. c. 5.

au Sotus Lib. I. de Nat. et Grat. cap. 18.

av S. Aug. de Nat. et Grat. cap. 68. Et de lib. arb. l. 3. n. 46.

az S. Cypr....

ax S. Aug. lib. 2. de Anima cap. 12. n. 17.

ba S. Thom. in 2. Sent. Dist. 28. q. I. art. 3. in arg. ad Contra.

bb Idem quaest. 24. de Verit. art. 14. ad 2.

bc S. Aug. lib. 22. contra Faust. cap. 88.

bd Idem lib. I. Retract. cap. 15.

be Idem Hom. 12. de 50.

bf S. Aug. lib. 2. de Anima cap. 21. num. 4.

bg Idem in eod. cap. II.

bh S. Hieron. lib. 2. cont. Jovin.

bi Tertull. lib. 2. cont. Marcian. cap. 5.

bl Marc. Erem. de Justif. et Oper.

bm S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. ad I.

bn S. Aug. lib. de Corrept. et Grat. cap. 5. et 6. alias 11.

bo Gotti Theol. tr. 5. q. 2. dub. 3. num. 51. et 52.

bp S. Prosp. de Vocat. Gent. cap. 5.

bq Bellarm. Contr. lib. 2. de Grat. et lib. arb. cap. 7.

br S. Thom. in 2. Sent. Dist. 20. q. I. a. 2 in corp.

bs P. Nugnez. I. 2. quaest. 109. art. 8.

Pag. 111.

bt P. Ledesm. de Auxil quaest. unic. art. 19.

bu Jansen, rediv. pag. 193.

bv P. Bannez. in I. p. q. 23. a. 3.

bz Gotti Theol. tom. I. q. 2. Dub. 3. § 3. n. 22. pag. 261.

bx S. Thom. quaest. 24. de Verit. art. II.

ca S. Thom. lib. 3. contra Gent. cap. 161.