In the following chapter, as we have noted above, we shall demonstrate that the grace of prayer is given to all. But this opinion does not please Jansenius; he even goes so far as to call it a hallucination: Hallucinatio est, qua putant semper adesse homini gratiam ut petant (It is a hallucination to suppose that the grace to pray is always present to man). Whereas, speaking according to his system, he says that even in order to pray there is needed the relatively victorious delectation, which is not granted to all; he therefore adds that not all have sufficient grace and the power to fulfill the precepts, since many lack the remote grace of praying as one ought, or of praying in any way at all: Cum ergo (as Jansenius continues) plurimi vel non petant gratiam illam qua possint praecepta implere vel non ita petant ut necessarium est, nec omnibus gratiam, vel ferventer petendi, vel omnino petendi Deus largiatur, apertissimum est Fidelibus multis deesse illam sufficientem gratiam, et consequentem illam perpetuam quam quidam praedicant, faciendi praecepti potestatem (Since therefore many either do not ask for that grace by which they could fulfill the precepts, or do not ask as is necessary, and God does not bestow on all the grace either of praying fervently or of praying at all, it is most evident that many of the faithful lack that sufficient grace, and consequently that perpetual power of fulfilling the precepts which some proclaim). Hence, before passing on to prove our own opinion, it is necessary to refute his pernicious system, from which all his errors derive, and to show that it was he, not the others, who was laboring under a hallucination.
The five Propositions of Jansenius, already condemned by the Church as heretical, are by now known to all. Now, as Tournely proves, all the aforesaid Propositions arise from his above-mentioned system of preponderant delectation, on which Jansenius founds his whole doctrine. And the same is said by Fr. Ignatius Graveson: Ex hoc infesto principio Jansenium ejusque Discipulos has erroneas deducere consecutiones (that is, the five Propositions), quae cum illo principio arctissimo vinculo colligatae cohaerent (From this pernicious principle Jansenius and his disciples deduce these erroneous conclusions, which are bound to that principle by the closest possible tie). The same is said by Fr. Berti, who writes that it is evident: ex principio duarum delectationum invincibilium tanquam ex radice fluere alios fere omnes Jansenii errores, ac praesertim quinque damnatae Proposihones (from the principle of the two invincible delectations, as from a root, there flow almost all the other errors of Jansenius, and especially the five condemned Propositions). And Fr. Fortunato of Brescia, in his work newly brought to light under the title Cornelii Jansenii Systema confutatum etc., demonstrates clearly that, once the system of Jansenius is admitted, the aforesaid condemned Propositions would necessarily have to be admitted.
Let us therefore set forth the system of Jansenius distinctly. He says that the will of man, after the sin of Adam, cannot act otherwise than by following either the delectation of grace, which he calls heavenly, or the delectation of concupiscence, which he calls earthly, according as the one prevails over the other. So that, if the heavenly delectation is greater, then it necessarily prevails; if the earthly delectation preponderates, then the will must necessarily yield to it.
And here it must be noted that Jansenius does not mean to speak of deliberate, or consequent, delectation — for in that all the Catholic Doctors would agree with him, since when the delectation is deliberate and embraced without necessity, but freely, by the will, then it is certainly necessary that the will act according to the delectation — but of indeliberate delectation. And it is in this sense that the celebrated text of St. Augustine is to be understood: Quod amplius delectat, secundum id operemur, necesse est (It is necessary that we act according to that which delights us more). Which text, as we shall demonstrate below, must necessarily be understood of deliberate and consequent delectation; but Jansenius falsely understands it (and on it he founds his whole doctrine) of indeliberate delectation, antecedent to every act of the will.
Hence, according to him, there is no longer any sufficient grace, since either it is of lesser weight, and can never suffice; or it surpasses concupiscence, and then it is necessarily efficacious: for he makes the whole efficacy of grace consist in nothing else than in the relative preponderance of indeliberate delectation: Non erit sufficiens gratia (these are his words), sed vel efficax vel ita inefficax, ex qua operatio nequidem sequi potest (There will be no sufficient grace, but it will be either efficacious, or so inefficacious that no operation can even follow from it).
Now, once such a system is posited, all the aforesaid five condemned Propositions follow from it as so many necessary conclusions. Let us leave aside the others and speak here only of the First and of the Third, which are most to our purpose. The First says: Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus justis volentibus et conantibus, secundum praesentes quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia, deest quoque illis gratia qua possibilia fiant (Some precepts of God are impossible for just men who will and strive to observe them, according to the powers they presently have; and they also lack the grace by which they might become possible). To such a degree, then (says Jansenius), do some precepts become impossible even for the just, who will and strive to observe them, inasmuch as they lack the grace that prevails over concupiscence. Nisi major, he writes, fuerit caelestis delectatio quam terrena, fieri non potest quin propriae voluntatis infirmitate vincamur (Unless the heavenly delectation is greater than the earthly, it cannot but be that we are overcome by the weakness of our own will). And elsewhere: Vigente enim delectatione carnali, impossibile est ut virtutis consideratio praevaleat (For when carnal delectation holds sway, it is impossible that the consideration of virtue should prevail). Although (Jansenius said) grace, speaking absolutely in itself and considered apart from the act and the circumstances, was most sufficient to move the will to good, nevertheless, speaking relatively — that is, when the carnal delectation is greater than the heavenly delectation (which, preponderating over grace, is always united to the act) — then grace is in act insufficient to draw to itself the consent of the will. And as Fr. Graveson wisely writes, the absolute power that man would have by virtue of grace to observe the precepts, when it derives from a grace inferior to concupiscence, is in act no longer a power, but a true impotence, so that the will is then altogether unable to do good, just as the lesser weight cannot overcome the greater.
But how then can man be blamed if he does not satisfy the precept, lacking as he does that help which would at least suffice for him to fulfill it? The objection is strong, and too manifestly just, so that Jansenius himself cannot help putting it to himself by saying: Quomodo non sint excusati, qui illo adjutorio carent, quandoquidem sine illo praeceptum implere non possent? (How are they not excused, who lack that help, since without it they could not fulfill the precept?) Let us see how he answers it. The difficulty is great, so he seeks to free himself from it in several ways. First he answers that impotence then excuses, when man wills to fulfill the precept and cannot; but not when he does not will to fulfill it. But we answer Jansenius that when, according to his principle, the will must necessarily yield to the indeliberate delectation of concupiscence because it prevails over grace, then it is physically impossible for man to will to fulfill the precept; for once the carnal preponderance is posited, grace no longer has active power sufficient to overcome it. And of this Jansenius does not doubt, saying that the superior delectation intrinsically determines and insuperably moves the will to accept it, the will remaining then altogether deprived of the relative power to resist. Quo fit, says Father Graveson, ut haec necessitas, in doctrina Jansenii eiusque Discipulorum, non sit necessitas moralis; sed antecedens et invincibilis, quae citra apertam haeresim admitti non potest (Whence it comes that this necessity, in the doctrine of Jansenius and his disciples, is not a moral necessity, but an antecedent and invincible one, which cannot be admitted without open heresy).
And Jansenius says that without the preponderant delectation of grace, it is as impossible for man to fulfill the precept as it is impossible to fly for one who has no wings, to see for one who is blind, to hear for the deaf, and to walk straight for one who has broken legs: Sine qua non magis potest homo bene operari, quam volare sine alis (Without which man can no more do good than fly without wings), (and elsewhere) quam homini caeco ut videat, vel surdo ut audiat, vel tibiis fracto ut recte gradiatur (than for a blind man to see, or for a deaf man to hear, or for one with broken legs to walk straight). And the same would be of one who had eyes but was deprived of light, because it is as physically impossible to see for the blind man who lacks eyes as for one who has eyes but lacks light; since physical impossibility is nothing other than that which surpasses the natural powers.
So everyone sees how unfounded this first answer of Jansenius is. Let us see the second; but the second is more unfounded than the first. He says that all the precepts are possible to man insofar as God can give him the grace to observe them: Omnes homines dicuntur posse credere, posse diligere Deum... haec enim potestas non est aliud, nisi flexibilis capacitas, per quam possunt suscipere fidem, et caritatem (All men are said to be able to believe, able to love God... for this power is nothing other than a flexible capacity through which they can receive faith and charity). So that according to Jansenius man sins in transgressing them insofar as he is capable of being able to receive the grace to fulfill them. But in this manner we say that even the blind man can see and the deaf man can hear, since God could indeed make him see and hear; yet meanwhile it is physically impossible, if God does not grant it, for the blind man to see and for the deaf man to hear. Wherefore to say that every precept, in order to be called possible, need only be possible to man in the event that God gave him the power to fulfill it — this is a manner of speaking either vain or fraudulent, in order to hide the truth; for I ask: what help can anyone ever receive from that grace which he could have, but at present does not have! This is the same as saying: man could observe all the precepts if he could observe them, but for now he cannot. When the sick man, says St. Augustine, has need of care in order to be healed, he can never be healed without the care, even though he wills it: Nec tamen, cum vult, potest, sed cum fuerit adhibita curatione, sanatus (Yet when he wills it, he cannot; but he is healed when the cure has been applied).
Jansenius gives the third answer, saying that the whole liberty of the free will consists in the complacency and in the knowledge of the delectable object: Quapropter (these are his words) lustratis fundamentis Augustini, quibus tota doctrina de arbitrii libertate nititur, nihil aliud existimamus quam cognitionem, ac delectationem seu delectabilem objecti complacentiam esse id quod tantam potestatem in liberum arbitrium habet, ut eam faciat velle vel nolle... De cognitione hic non multum solliciti sumus, illam enim ad volendum esse necessariam vix quisquam dubitat (Wherefore, having examined the foundations of Augustine on which the whole doctrine of the liberty of the will rests, we judge that it is nothing other than knowledge and delectation, or the delectable complacency of the object, which has such power over the free will as to make it will or not will... Of knowledge we are here not much concerned, for that it is necessary for willing, hardly anyone doubts). So that according to Jansenius the liberty of man consists as much in the complacency of delectation as in the knowledge of the object, that is, in the indifferent judgment by which man knows the good and the evil of the action, as for example in murder one already knows the evil of the crime and the pleasure of revenge. Hence he says elsewhere that the wicked sin insofar as through the law they already know the malice of sin: Profertur primus effectus legis dare cognitionem peccati (The first effect of the law is brought forward: to give the knowledge of sin); availing himself of the text of St. Paul, Peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem (Rom. 7:7: I did not know sin except through the law). Which Calvin had already said before him, writing: Finis ergo legis est, ut reddatur homo inexcusabilis; nec male hoc modo definietur, quod sit conscientiae cognitio inter justum et injustum discernentis, ad tollendum ignorantiae praetextum (The end of the law, therefore, is that man be rendered inexcusable; nor would it be badly defined in this way: that it is the knowledge of conscience discerning between the just and the unjust, to remove the pretext of ignorance). But we answer that it can never be that the indifferent judgment — that is, the knowledge of good and evil, which belongs solely to the intellect — could constitute the liberty of the will, which belongs entirely to the will; for liberty consists in nothing other than the free choice which the will makes to do or not to do a thing.
Jansenius gives the fourth answer, but the fourth is more incongruous and unfounded than all the first three. He says that for sinning, the liberty of indifference is not necessary — so that man must be free from every necessity of sinning — but that the liberty of exercise, or of choice, suffices, by which he can abstain from that sin to which concupiscence pushes him by committing another: Qua quis (these are his words) potest facere, et ab eo, saltem aliud perpetrando, abstinere (By which one can act, and abstain from it, at least by perpetrating another). Thereby he places man in such a necessity that, in order to avoid one sin, he must necessarily commit another; and he says that such a liberty already makes him guilty of fault, although he is necessitated to sin in one way or the other. Here is how he explains it more clearly elsewhere: Arbitrium lapsorum hominum nullo modo in peccando desinit esse liberum, quamvis generali quadam peccandi necessitate vinciatur; erit enim liberum quoad exercitium, ut loquuntur, necessitatum quoad specificationem (The free will of fallen men in no way ceases to be free in sinning, although it is bound by a certain general necessity of sinning; for it will be free as regards exercise, as they say, necessitated as regards specification). Against this last answer could be opposed all those things that we said above against Juenin (in Chapter II, p. 111), who holds that some sinners, although deprived of sufficient grace, nevertheless sin by such a liberty of exercise. But what sort of liberty is this (as we already said), by which a man — whether just or a sinner — could be called guilty when he is necessitated to sin in one way or another? St. Thomas Aquinas says that it is heresy to say that the will merits or demerits in acting by necessity, although it is not forced to act: Quidam posuerunt, quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ad aliquid eligendum; nec tamen ponebant, quod voluntas cogeretur... Haec autem opinio est haeretica, tollit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in humanis actibus; non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium, quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit, quod vitare non possit (Certain men have held that the will of man is moved of necessity to choose something; yet they did not hold that the will is forced... But this opinion is heretical, for it destroys the notion of merit and demerit in human acts; for that does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious which someone so does of necessity that he cannot avoid it). Moreover, when someone is necessitated to commit one or another sin, according to what all theologians commonly say, in choosing the lesser, although he chooses it voluntarily, he does not sin, because he is deprived of the liberty necessary for the deed to be imputed to him as sin. So that, speaking in our case, when by reason of concupiscence superior to grace man were to have recourse to the lesser sin, he would not sin.
But setting aside all these reflections, the direct answer is that, given Jansenius's principle of relatively victorious delectation, this liberty of exercise — of abstaining from one sin by committing another — can in no way exist. His principle is, as we have ascertained above, that when the carnal delectation surpasses the heavenly, then the will is determinately necessitated to consent to it, according as it is physically impelled by it. And therefore in one place he says that the superior delectation takes away the indifference of the will; for just as the weight pushes down the pan of the balance which was before in equilibrium, so the delectation pushes the will to accept that lust to which it moves it: Cum hoc efficiat (delectatio carnalis) blanditiis motus sui, ut qui ad agendum et non agendum ante motum esset indifferens ipso motu libidinis in alteram partem, instar aequilibrii cui pondus additur, impellatur (Since carnal delectation effects by the blandishments of its motion that he who before the motion was indifferent to acting and to not acting is, by the very motion of lust, driven to the one side, like a balance to which a weight is added). He says the same in another place, where, rejecting those who maintain that the superior delectation moves morally, he says that it does not move morally, but physically impels and predetermines the will to embrace the object proposed: Siquidem moralis praedeterminatio illa dicitur, quae tantum se habet ex parte objecti, quemadmodum facit ille qui consulit, praecipit, rogat, sed haec (delectatio) se habet in ipsa potentia voluntatis, quam propriae suae suavitatis magnitudine ad volendum applicat et applicando determinat, utpote causans in ea hoc ipsum ut se determinet, ideoque praedeterminat (For that is called a moral predetermination which acts only on the part of the object, as does he who counsels, commands, or entreats; but this [delectation] acts upon the very power of the will, which it applies to willing by the greatness of its own sweetness, and in applying determines, inasmuch as it causes in it this very thing, that it determine itself; and therefore it predetermines it). So that, according to Jansenius, delectation predetermines the will to embrace that object to which it moves it, before the will determines itself. And that this is the true mind of Jansenius, the learned Dirois does not doubt, who says that for this reason Jansenius does not differ from the Astrologers, who made the will of man subject to the influence of the planets, so that voluntas determinatur ad electionem sui finis aliqua impressione, quae illius determinationem antecedat (the will is determined to the choice of its end by some impression which precedes that determination). The same wrote the Archbishop of Vienna, Author of the book Bajanismus, et Jansenismus redivivus, saying: Jansenistas contendere delectatione gradibus superiori voluntatem invincibiliter determinari ad operandum, absque ullo respectu ad futuram ipsius voluntatis determinationem (the Jansenists contend that by the delectation superior in degree the will is invincibly determined to act, without any regard to the future determination of the will itself).
This being supposed, where is the liberty of exercise any longer? For the preponderant delectation, according to Jansenius, alone predetermines the will to accept it; in such a way that, just as in a balance it is necessary that the lesser weight yield to the greater, so it is necessary that the will yield to the relatively victorious delectation. If therefore anyone (for example) is impelled by the delectation of having another's goods, it is true that this man could abstain from the theft out of affection for his own good name, but in the case that this affection is either not present, or is not greater than the delectation of stealing, the affection for his good name certainly cannot prevail; and behold, then all liberty of exercise certainly ceases.
But let us now pass on to speak of the Third Proposition of Jansenius, which says: Ad merendum, et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione (For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, there is not required in man liberty from necessity, but liberty from compulsion suffices). Jansenius says, therefore, that in order to merit or to sin the liberty of indifference which excludes necessity is not necessary, but it is enough that the will does not resist. And he goes on to assert that it is a paradox to say that the act of the will is free insofar as the will can accept it and refuse it. This Proposition, also condemned as heretical, springs in like manner from the same system; for, supposing that the will, when it is moved by the preponderant delectation, must necessarily obey it, it necessarily follows (according to Jansenius) that in order to merit or to sin it is enough that man should will to consent to the delectation, even though he cannot help willing it, and is physically necessitated to will it. A doctrine rightly called monstrous by Father Serry: Stare meritum posse cum agendi necessitate (That merit can stand together with necessity of acting). And earlier already called heretical by St. Thomas Aquinas, whose words already reported above may I be permitted here to repeat: Quidam posuerunt, quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate moveatur ad aliquid eligendum, nec tamen ponebant quod voluntas cogeretur. Haec autem opinio est haeretica, tollit enim rationem meriti ac demeriti in humanis actionibus; non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium, quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit, quod vitare non possit (Certain men have held that the will of man is moved of necessity to choose something; yet they did not hold that the will was compelled. But this opinion is heretical, for it takes away the notion of merit and demerit in human actions; for that does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious which a person so does of necessity that he cannot avoid it).
And it is rightly called heresy, since it is contrary to all the divine Scriptures. Fidelis autem Deus (wrote St. Paul) est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis; sed faciet etiam cum tentatione proventum, ut possitis sustinere (1 Cor. 10:13: But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able; but will also make with the temptation an issue, that you may be able to bear it). But Jansenius will have it that man is sometimes so abandoned by grace that he cannot resist the temptation, and is necessitated to yield to it. Moses said to the people: Mandatum hoc quod ego praecipio hodie, non supra te est (Deut. 30:11: This commandment which I command you this day is not above you). Beatus... qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus; facere mala, et non fecit (Sir. 31:10: Blessed... is he that could have transgressed, and has not transgressed; that could do evil, and has not done it). Therefore, in order to merit, it is not enough that man act voluntarily, but it is further necessary that he act freely — that is, that he be able to leave off fulfilling the precepts, and that it be not necessary for him to fulfill them. And the same holds conversely in sinning — namely, that he have the grace to abstain from it, and through his own fault does not abstain from it. Nor does it avail to say, as the impious Theodore Beza answered to this, that such necessity depends not on nature but on original sin, whereby man has voluntarily deprived himself of liberty, and is therefore justly punished by sinning, even though he sin by necessity. For it is answered that if a servant through his own fault were to break his legs, the master would be unjust if, after having forgiven him that fault, he then wished to command him to run, and were to punish him if he did not run. Peccati reum (said St. Augustine) tenere quenquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis esse, et insaniae (To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is the height of iniquity and of madness).
Moreover, granted that man merited and demerited by acting of necessity, without the relative power to the contrary, I would not know how this could be made to agree with the other Scriptures that say: Optio vobis datur.
Eligite hodie quod placet, cui servire potissimum debeatis, utrum diis Amorrhaeorum... Ego autem, et domus mea serviemus Domino (Josh. 24:15: The choice is given you: choose this day what pleases you, whom you should chiefly serve, whether the gods of the Amorites... But I and my house will serve the Lord). There can be no choice where one acts of necessity and without liberty; wherefore in the said text the liberty which man has from necessity is clearly proved. Plena utriusvis (says the learned Petavius on this passage) eligendi potestas ostenditur, ut quasi suspensa et in medio posita voluntas, alterum quod volet e duobus asciscat (A full power of choosing either is shown to be present, so that the will, as it were suspended and placed in the middle, may take to itself whichever of the two it wills). The same is said in other places of Scripture:
Testes invoco hodie caelum et terram, quod proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem, benedictionem et maledictionem. Elige ergo vitam, ut et tu vivas, et semen tuum (Deut. 30:19: I call heaven and earth to witness this day, that I have proposed to you life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose therefore life, that both you and your seed may live). Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui. Adjecit mandata et praecepta sua... Ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum; quod placuerit ei dabitur illi (Sir. 15:14-18: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added His commandments and precepts... Before man is life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him). Petavius adds on this other passage, and says: If Ecclesiasticus now found himself having to decide the present point, how could he have more clearly expressed the liberty which man enjoys from necessity? Non potuit expressioribus vocibus, si inter nos viveret, ac de vita nostra judicaret, quam isthic fecit, ut libertatis humanae, arbitriique liberi naturam ac proprietatem describeret (He could not, if he lived among us and were to pass judgment on our life, have expressed in clearer words than he there did the nature and property of human liberty and of free will). The other Scriptures signify the same: Vocavi, et renuistis (Prov. 1:24: I called, and you refused). Ipsi fuerunt rebelles lumini (Job 24:13: They have been rebellious to the light). Expectavi ut faceret uvas, et fecit labruscas (Isa. 5:2: I looked for it to bring forth grapes, and it has brought forth wild grapes). Vos semper Spiritui Sancto resistitis (Acts 7:51: You always resist the Holy Spirit). It is certainly the work of the Holy Spirit to call, to enlighten the minds, and to move the wills to good; but how can it be said that he opposes the calls, is rebellious to the light, and resists grace, who is destitute of the preponderant grace, and therefore must necessarily yield to the concupiscence that prevails?
But how comes it, says Jansenius, that what I have said, St. Augustine has already said before me — namely, that we must necessarily do what most delights us, according to the text of the Saint so often cited: Quod amplius delectat secundum id operemur, necesse est? (that we must necessarily act according to what delights us more?) But before answering Jansenius, it is necessary to premise that St. Augustine, because in his days he had to refute many heresies then current in the matter of grace, all different from one another, had to speak of it in various ways and at length, and therefore in many places spoke obscurely. Whence it has since happened that not only does each of the Catholic Schools boast of having him on its side, although they are of different opinions among themselves; but even Calvin and Jansenius, whose errors have already been condemned by the Church, have had the boldness to claim him as their supporter. Calvin, writing against Pighius, says: Nos nihil quam Augustinum sequimur... Etiamsi crepet Pighius, nobis extorquere hoc non potest quin Augustinus sit noster (We follow nothing but Augustine... Even should Pighius burst with spite, he cannot wrest this from us — that Augustine is ours). Jansenius, moreover, reports St. Augustine as his sole Master, so much so that he entitled his Work with the single name of Augustinus. And all the Jansenists call themselves by no other name than Augustinians. From this premise I mean to infer nothing else here than that many passages of St. Augustine, lest we should err, need to be explained by comparing them with other texts of his, where the Saint declares his true mind. Let us now come to the point.
We already mentioned above that the aforesaid doctrine of St. Augustine neither should nor can be understood of undeliberate delight, which precedes all cooperation of the human will, but must be understood of deliberate and consequent delight: for when man freely accepts the delight, then it is certainly necessary that he act according to it. And this is proved by what the holy Doctor says in other places, where he identifies delight with love, or rather explains that the superior delight is nothing else than that deliberate love and that affection which predominates in us by our free choice; in which delight, when we freely take pleasure, it is then necessary that we act according to it. So that in substance the Saint means nothing else than that it is necessary for the will to act according to what it deliberately loves more; since in one place he says that delight is, as it were, a weight of the soul that draws it along with itself: Delectatio quippe quasi est pondus Animae (Delight is indeed, as it were, the weight of the soul). In another place he says that this weight which draws the soul is each one's love: Amor meus, pondus meum (My love is my weight). He explains this more clearly in another place, where he writes that our attention must be directed to this: ut nos ita Deo opitulante ordinemus, ut inferioribus non offendamur, solis autem superioribus delectemur (that with God's help we should so order ourselves as not to be allured by lower things, but to delight only in higher things). See how clearly he speaks of deliberate and freely accepted delight. In another place he says the same: Quid est trahi voluptate? Delectare in Domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui (What is it to be drawn by pleasure? Delight in the Lord, and He will give you the petitions of your heart). In another: Videte quomodo trahit Pater, docendo delectat, non necessitatem imponendo (See how the Father draws: by teaching He delights, not by imposing necessity). In another: Si frui delectaverit, delectatio illicita refraenanda est; velut cum jejunamus, palati appetitus assurgit: non fit nisi delectatione (that is, undeliberate), sed eam dominantis rationis jure cohibemus (If enjoyment delights, the unlawful delight must be restrained; as when we fast, the appetite of the palate rises up: it is produced only by delight — that is, undeliberate delight — but we restrain it by the right of dominant reason). So that according to St. Augustine the delight that incites to what is unlawful is indeed freely repressed by man with dominant reason and with the help of grace. Hence the Saint exhorts us: Justitia sic delectet, ut vincat etiam licitas delectationes (Let justice so delight us that it overcomes even lawful delights). This becomes clearer from what the holy Doctor then adds in the same place of the controverted text; for after having said there: Quod amplius delectat secundum id operemur, necesse est (It is necessary that we act according to what delights us more), he says: Manifestum est certe secundum id nos vivere, quod sectati fuerimus; sectabimur autem quod (note) dilexerimus. Itaque si ex adverso exsistant duo, praeceptum justitiae, et consuetudo carnalis et utrumque diligitur, ibi sectabimur quod amplius dilexerimus (It is certainly evident that we live according to what we have pursued; but we shall pursue what — note — we have loved. Therefore, if two things stand in opposition, the precept of justice and carnal habit, and both are loved, there we shall pursue what we have loved more). So that when the Saint says it is necessary that we act according to what delights us more, he means nothing else than that the will must necessarily act according to what it loves more. Nor does it avail to say with Jansenius that what delights more is loved more, for this is not always true, and in this St. Augustine himself contradicts him, speaking of himself in his Confessions: Non faciebam quod et incomparabili affectu magis placebat et mox ut vellem, possem (I did not do what both pleased me more with incomparable affection, and what I could have done as soon as I willed it). By which he gives us to understand that he was already moved by God to good with an incomparable undeliberate affection, whereby virtue was already coming to please him more than vice, and he could well have practiced it, had he willed; but he, resisting grace, rejected virtue and abandoned himself to vice.
Moreover, if St. Augustine had believed it necessary to act according to the greater delight, he could not have said: Titillat delectatio illicita concupiscientiae, pugna, resiste, noli consentire, et impletur hic: Post concupiscentias tuas non eas (When the unlawful delight of concupiscence tickles, fight, resist, do not consent, and here is fulfilled: Go not after your lusts). Moreover he says elsewhere that of two persons who have the same impure temptation, it sometimes happens that one consents to it and the other resists; and why? he answers that the one wills to observe chastity, the other does not: Si eadem tentatione (note, the same) ambo tententur, et unus ei cedat atque consentiat, alter perseveret; quid aliud apparet, nisi unum voluisse, alterum noluisse a castitate deficere? (If both are tempted by the same temptation — note, the same — and one yields to it and consents, while the other perseveres, what else appears but that the one willed and the other did not will to fall away from chastity?). Moreover, since the Saint has said it is necessary that we act according to what more delights us, the doubt may now arise whether he means to speak of deliberate or of undeliberate delight. Now we say this: if the Saint meant it of undeliberate delight, he would consequently come to deny that, for the will to be truly free, it must be free not only from violence but also from necessity; but we read that the Saint in a thousand places teaches the opposite, saying that man, in good as in evil, acts without necessity: therefore, in speaking of the predominant and victorious delight, he must necessarily be understood to speak of the deliberate and consequent delight. And what are these places? Here they are, they are a thousand: Voluntas nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate; non enim est nobis liberum, quod in potestate non habemus (Our will would not even be a will, unless it were in our power; for that is not free for us which we do not have in our power). In another place, making mention of the Gospel of St. Matthew in chapter 7, where it speaks of the good fruits that grow from the good tree and of the evil ones that grow from the evil tree, he says thus: Hoc ergo Dominus dicens, facite hoc, aut facite illud, ostendit esse in potestate (hominum) quid facerent... Qui enim servare legem non vult, in potestate ejus est, si velit (Therefore, the Lord in saying, Do this or do that, shows that what they did was in the power (of men)... For he who does not will to keep the law, it is in his power, if he wills). To this Calvin replies that St. Augustine was speaking here of innocent man; but Bellarmine wisely corrects him, saying that the Saint was there treating of that Gospel where the Lord was speaking against the Jews and saying: A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos (By their fruits you shall know them). Hence it can never be said that St. Augustine intended to speak there of Adam. And this same thing which the Saint said writing against the Manicheans, he repeats writing against the Pelagians, saying: Ubi dicitur noli hoc, et noli illud, et ibi ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum in Divinis monitis opus voluntatis exigitur, satis liberum demonstratur arbitrium (Where it is said, Do not this and do not that, and where in the divine admonitions the work of the will is required to do or not to do something, free will is sufficiently demonstrated). Here Jansenius objects (the great partisan of Calvin) that St. Augustine speaks of necessity through violence, not of simple necessity. But Jansenius errs likewise, because the Saint did not dissent in this from the Pelagians, indeed conceding to them that the will was free both from coercive and from simple necessity; hence, writing against Julian, he did not hesitate to say: Liberum in hominibus esse arbitrium utrique dicimus. Liberum autem esse quenquam ad agendum bonum sine adjutorio Dei etc. vos dicitis; hinc estis Pelagiani (We both say that free will exists in men. But that anyone is free to do good without the help of God, etc., you say; hence you are Pelagians). Therefore, in saying, We both say, St. Augustine admitted the same liberty to do and not to do which the Pelagians maintained, who certainly required it to be exempt from all necessity; so that there is no doubt that the Saint held that the will was free not only from violence, but from all necessity; only in this did he contradict the Pelagians, that they wanted the will to be free to do good even without grace.
Moreover St. Augustine, speaking of the liberty of the will and of the efficacy of grace, says it is a difficult thing to reconcile the one with the other: Ista quaestio, ubi de arbitrio voluntatis, et de Dei Gratia disputatur ita est ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium negari Dei Gratia videatur, quando autem asseritur Dei Gratia, liberum arbitrium putetur auferri (This question, where free will and the grace of God are discussed, is so difficult to discern that when free will is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; but when the grace of God is asserted, free will is thought to be taken away). If St. Augustine had supposed that the will was not free from simple necessity, but only from violence, it would not have been difficult, but very easy, to understand how grace operated; therefore, inasmuch as he said it was difficult to understand it, it was because he held that efficacious grace certainly obtained its effect in good acts, and, on the other hand, that the will, in doing them freely, acted without any necessity that determined it to be able to do or will only those acts to which grace moved it. For the rest, the holy Doctor held it for certain that in the observance of the precepts man, with the help of sufficient grace, was free either to fulfill them, or at least to obtain by prayer the greater help to fulfill them: otherwise (as he said) God would not have imposed such precepts upon him: Neque enim imperaret hoc Deus ut faceremus, si impossibile judicaret, ut hoc ab homine fieret (For God would not command us to do this, if He judged it impossible for it to be done by man).
Let us note other texts of St. Augustine, in which he confirms the same view, that the human will is free from all necessity: Non enim peccatum esset, quod non fieret voluntate; ac per hoc et poena injusta esset, si homo voluntatem non haberet liberam, hoc est si necessario tam bene quam male operaretur (For that would not be a sin which was not done by the will; and hence punishment also would be unjust, if man did not have a free will, that is, if he acted of necessity in good as well as in evil). Elsewhere he says: Quis enim non clamet stultum esse, praecepta dare ei, cui liberum non est quod praecipitur facere, et iniquum esse eum damnare, cui non fuit potestas jussa complere (For who would not cry out that it is folly to give precepts to one who is not free to do what is commanded, and iniquity to condemn one who had not the power to fulfill what was ordered?). Elsewhere: Motum quo voluntas ab incommutabili bono deflectit, si natura, vel necessitate existit, culpabilem esse nullo pacto posse (The movement by which the will turns away from the unchangeable good, if it exists by nature or by necessity, can in no wise be blameworthy). And after saying that prevenient grace is necessary to do good, he adds: Consentire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dissentire, propriae voluntatis est (But to consent to the call of God, or to dissent from it, belongs to one's own will). By which he clearly teaches that the will can freely obey grace and resist it. Nor is it of any avail to say with Jansenius that St. Augustine by this means nothing else than that consenting and dissenting is the proper office of the will; for it can never be believed that the holy Doctor would have uselessly undertaken to prove that consent and dissent belong to the will and not to the intellect, a thing which even the unlettered know how to distinguish. All the more since the Saint in that place first said: Neminem habere in potestate, quid ei veniat in mentem (No one has it in his power what comes into his mind), and then wrote the aforesaid words, Consentire autem etc. Hence it is seen that he speaks without doubt of the free power which the will has to dissent from, or to consent to, that which comes into the mind. In another place he says: Nemo nisi Deus facere arborem potest (meaning the good trees that yield good fruits, and the bad that yield bad fruits), sed habet unusquisque in voluntate aut eligere quae bona sunt, aut quae mala etc. Hoc ergo Dominus dicens, aut facite hoc, aut facite illud, ostendit esse in potestate quid facerent (No one but God can make a tree; but each one has it in his will either to choose the things that are good or those that are evil. Therefore the Lord, in saying, "Either do this, or do that," showed that it was in their power what they should do). In another place, explaining the sine quo help, he says: Sine quo voluntas velle non possit; sic tamen ut velle et nolle, uti vel non uti, in ejus libero arbitrio relinquatur (Without which the will could not will; yet in such wise that to will and to refuse, to use or not to use, is left to its free will). From all this it is seen all too clearly how far St. Augustine was from the view of Jansenius — that the human will is not free from necessity in acting, and still less that it is necessitated to follow the superior delectation which by its impulse invincibly moves and determines it.
But to conclude according to our purpose — that of proving that the Lord gives to everyone the grace, whether proximate or remote, of prayer for observing the precepts, since otherwise the transgression of them could not be imputed to him as a fault — it suffices to see what the contradictory propositions of the two aforementioned Propositions of Jansenius are. The first said: Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus justis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia, deest quoque illis gratia, qua possibilia fiant (Some precepts of God are impossible to just men who will and strive according to the powers they presently have; the grace by which they may become possible is also wanting to them). The Catholic proposition contradictory to the error, then, is this: None of God's precepts is impossible, at least to the just who will to observe them and strive to do so; nor do they lack, even according to the strength they have at present, the grace (whether proximate or at least remote) by which they can at least mediately obtain by prayer the greater help to fulfill them. And here let it be noted again that, to avoid the condemned error, it is not enough to concede the absolute possibility of observing the precept, for even the Jansenists admit such a possibility; but one must further admit the possibility relative also to the present carnal delectation, which exceeds that of grace, of satisfying the precept when it urges, or at least of obtaining by prayer the necessary grace to observe it: for precisely in this does the error of Jansenius consist — in denying the possibility, not the absolute but the relative.
The third Proposition of Jansenius then said: Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione (For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man, but freedom from compulsion suffices). The Catholic contradictory, therefore, is this: To merit and demerit, even in the state of fallen nature, both for the just and for sinners, freedom is required not only from violence but also from simple necessity; for according to Catholic doctrine, the voluntary, whenever it is necessary, is not free with that freedom which suffices in the present life to merit or demerit; but to merit or demerit, the will must be free from every necessity of having to consent determinately to one of the two sides.
In short, Fr. Fortunatus of Brescia (a man commonly celebrated by modern scholars, and especially by Muratori), in his work newly brought to light under the title Cornelii Jansenii Systema confutatum, says that if the system of Jansenius were true, the divine law would be either vain or unjust; for according to that system, if the heavenly delectation preponderates, then the will, even though there were no law, is necessitated to follow determinately the impulse of the delectation; and thus the law would be vain. If, on the other hand, the earthly delectation preponderates, then the law would be unjust, since God would impose a precept physically impossible for man to observe, inasmuch as the will must then necessarily yield to the temptation. And in this way all the threats and admonitions of the divine Scriptures would be useless; and there would no longer be any human action that would merit reward or punishment, since everything would be done by men out of necessity. Hence, to one who exhorted us to live well we could answer what Eusebius wrote against the Fatalists: Non sunt potestates hae meae, o Doctor; faciam enim, si fata volunt (These powers are not mine, O Doctor; for I shall act if the fates so will — that is, if the carnal delectation does not preponderate); aderit necessario quod fatatum est (what is fated will necessarily come to pass); I must necessarily follow the delectation that prevails. He says, moreover, that in admitting such a system one must also admit Manichaeism, which established two principles, a good and an evil one, and held that, since all actions proceed either from the one or the other principle, man must necessarily follow the one that prevailed. Nor does it avail to say that such necessity in the system of the victorious delectation does not derive from a good or evil principle, as the Manicheans held, but depends on the sin of Adam, which was its cause; for here the question is not by what principle the will then acts necessarily when it is moved, but whether the will after the sin of Adam remained free from the necessity of acting — and this is what is denied by the Jansenists, who hold that the will merits and demerits even though it is necessitated to will that to which the superior delectation determines it. But as the aforesaid Father of Brescia well observes, the books of Arnauld, of Irenaeus, of Ventrochio, and of other Jansenists were condemned for the very reason that in them the principle of Jansenius was established — that of the two invincible delectations according to the superiority of degrees. And for this reason we know that the Theology of Juenin was also prohibited, who, although he did not expressly hold the aforesaid system, nevertheless on this point imprudently spoke too obscurely, saying: Natura physica gratiae efficacis non in alio posita est, quam in victrici delectatione, qua mens circa bonum afficitur (The physical nature of efficacious grace is placed in nothing other than in the victorious delectation by which the mind is drawn to the good). He did not, to be sure, say relative victrici (relatively victorious), but he then proves his proposition with the oft-mentioned doctrine of St. Augustine: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est (What delights us more, according to that we must necessarily act). And for this reason his work was prohibited for so long; and yet it has lately been permitted, inasmuch as a Compendium was added to it, entitled The True Doctrine of the Church, drawn from the Theology of the learned Honoré Tournely, who extensively and excellently refuted the aforesaid system. Finally, the Father of Brescia concludes, saying thus: Manifestum relinquitur et Jansenianum Systema illis (that is, to Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius) plane favere; indeque a viro Catholico sine crimine violatae Fidei propugnari nullatenus posse (It remains manifest that the Jansenian system plainly favors them — that is, Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius — and hence that it can in no wise be upheld by a Catholic without the crime of violated Faith). Non enim tuta Fide, salvaque Religione defendi potest systema, cujus fundamentalibus admissis principiis, damnata dogmata necessum est approbare (For a system cannot be defended with the Faith unharmed and Religion safe, when, its fundamental principles once admitted, it is necessary to approve condemned dogmas). And Tournely meant the same, writing: Cum Ecclesia quinque Propositiones damnaverit in sensu Jansenii, necesse est illas damnatas fuisse in ipso Jansenii Systemate, delectationis scilicet superioris ac relative victricis, quae totius Systematis fundamentum est (Since the Church has condemned the five Propositions in the sense of Jansenius, it is necessary that they were condemned in the very system of Jansenius — namely, in that of the superior and relatively victorious delectation, which is the foundation of the whole system).
Nor does it avail to say that the System of Jansenius is one thing — which supposes the relatively victorious delectation to be undeliberated, that is, which comes into us without any consent of the will — while the System of the delectation that is likewise relatively victorious by the superiority of degrees, but deliberated, is another; since this latter does not conquer alone and by its own forces, as the Advocates of that System say, but conquers by being strengthened by the forces of the consenting will. And therefore they say that the preponderant delectation, although it certainly and infallibly conquers, does not however conquer necessarily, as Jansenius held. It does not avail, since Tournely well replies that that Grace (or delectation) which is infallibly efficacious, and invincibly determines the will by the preponderance of its forces, cannot fail to be necessitating as to the consent of the will. And he proves it thus: Ea Gratia est necessitas, quae supponit voluntatem destitutam vera potentia resistendi; atqui talis est Gratia infallibiliter efficax ex virium graduali superioritate. Nam huiusmodi Gratia supponit voluntatem non habere ad resistendum nisi vires inferiores. Repugnat autem, ut vires superiores, quae agunt ut superiores, vincantur ab inferioribus, alias necesse esset, ut inferiores operarentur ultra suae activitatis gradus. (That Grace is necessitating which supposes the will deprived of a true power of resisting; but such is the Grace which is infallibly efficacious from the gradual superiority of its forces. For Grace of this kind supposes the will to have only inferior forces wherewith to resist. But it is repugnant that superior forces, acting as superior, should be overcome by inferior ones; otherwise it would be necessary that the inferior ones should operate beyond the degree of their own activity.) Nor does it avail to reply that the forces of the relatively victorious Grace are indeed superior when compared with concupiscence taken by itself alone, but not when compared with the forces of concupiscence joined with those of the will; because (the same Tournely replies) such forces of the will could be admitted only in regard to the evil that man can do of himself, overcoming at least one vice by another vice, or barely in regard to good of the natural order, but not in regard to supernatural good, that is, to the overcoming of a strong concupiscence, which cannot be done without Divine Grace. For this reason the Fathers of Diospolis required of the Pelagians that, among the other articles, each one should confess this: Ut fateatur, quando contra tentationes concupiscentiasque illicitas dimicamus, non ex propria voluntate, sed ex Dei adjutorio provenire victoriam. (That he confess that, when we struggle against temptations and illicit concupiscences, the victory comes not from our own will, but from the help of God.) And the reason is, as St. Thomas Aquinas teaches, that no active principle can produce an effect exceeding its own activity; hence a natural principle, or cause, cannot produce a supernatural effect: Nullus actus (these are the words of St. Thomas Aquinas) excedit proportionem principii activi. Et ideo videmus in rebus naturalibus, quod nulla res potest perficere effectum per suam operationem, qui excedat virtutem activam, sed solum potest producere per operationem suam effectum suae virtuti proportionatum. (No act exceeds the proportion of the active principle; and therefore we see in natural things that nothing can accomplish by its operation an effect which exceeds its active power, but can only produce by its operation an effect proportionate to its own power.) So that the natural forces of the human will, although united to the forces of Grace, which are inferior to the forces of concupiscence, cannot contribute to produce an effect supernatural, such as is the overcoming of a violent concupiscence preponderant over Grace. And in fact the Jansenists say: Let it be granted to us that the delectation most certainly conquers by reason of its superior forces, and this is enough for us. Here is how one of them speaks, the Abbé de Bourzeis: Nobis enim sufficit, quod haec sola nobis veritas concedatur, nimirum quoties Gratiae Dei consentimus, id oriri semper ex eo quod rectus amor, quem Deus nobis inspirat, viribus superior est perverso amori, et quia viribus superior est, idcirco eum certissime superare. (For it suffices us that this truth alone be granted to us, namely, that whenever we consent to the Grace of God, it always arises from this, that the right love which God inspires in us is superior in force to perverse love, and because it is superior in force, it most certainly overcomes it.) Therefore Tournely, speaking of the two Systems, namely the one of the absolutely victorious delectation and the other of the relatively victorious delectation, concludes thus: Novimus quidem orthodoxos Theologos, qui vim Gratiae efficacem colligunt ex ipsius delectatione absolute ac simpliciter victrice; quique in gratia sufficiente pares vires agnoscunt ad appositam actualem cupiditatem superandam. Verum qui gratiam velint esse victricem relative ex superioritate graduum quippe non aliam sufficientem admittunt gratiam quam viribus inferiorem oppositae superiori concupiscentiae, non alios quam Janseniani Systematis Defensores novimus. (We indeed know orthodox Theologians who derive the efficacious power of Grace from the absolutely and simply victorious delectation itself, and who in sufficient grace acknowledge forces equal to overcoming the opposed actual concupiscence; but those who would have grace be victorious relatively by the superiority of degrees — inasmuch as they admit no other sufficient grace than one inferior in force to the opposed superior concupiscence — we know to be none other than Defenders of the Jansenian System.)
So that, to conclude, we do not here intend to reprove the opinion which says that the will, even when it follows the greater delectation, nevertheless always operates freely, that is, without necessity, and with a true power (not a power in name only, or hypothetical) to act to the contrary; but we only reject the opinion of those who hold that, when one of the delectations, heavenly or carnal, is victorious because it surpasses the other in degree, then there remains no power in man to resist it and overcome it, by reason that the greater force infallibly conquers the lesser.
Nevertheless, on this point I cannot omit to state the difficulty that I find in this System of the relatively victorious delectation.
The Defenders of this System say, as Fr. Gian Lorenzo Berti also says, that the efficacy of Grace, in the way in which they establish it, does not differ in substance from the efficacy taught by the Thomists, although on different principles; since the Thomists make the efficacy of Grace consist in physical predetermination, while they make it consist in the preponderant delectation. What predetermination does (they say) in the second act, in applying the liberty of free will to consent, the same does the delectation. For the rest, the one opinion as well as the other teaches that man retains the power in the first act to act in opposition, so that the will always operates freely and without necessity.
But I reflect that, as the principles of these two opinions are different and their reasons different, so also are their consequences different. The reason of the efficacy according to the Thomists is that the created will is in passive potency, being in potency to receive the motion of Grace; hence, in order to come to the act of the work, it is necessary that it be moved by God, as the first Agent and first free cause, Who applies and determines the potency to the act by predetermination. This is as regards the act; but as regards the potency, the Thomists say that man has the grace of a power wholly complete and proximately ready to be able to do good. So Fr. Gonet: Gratia quae dat posse, dat totum complementum, et totam virtutem, seu sufficientiam quae requiritur ex parte actus primi. (The grace which gives the power to act gives the whole complement and the whole virtue, or sufficiency, which is required on the part of the first act.) So also Cardinal Gotti: Gratia sufficiens dat posse proximum et expeditum in ratione potentiae. (Sufficient grace gives a proximate and ready power in the order of potency.) And so all the other Thomists commonly; and if any one of them seems to speak otherwise, he is speaking of the second act, not of the first.
The reason, on the other hand, of the principle of those who maintain the opinion of the delectation superior in degree is that (as they say) whereas before, in the state of innocent Nature, sufficient grace alone sufficed for man to do good — since free will was sound and stood in perfect equilibrium, it could well operate with sufficient grace alone, without need of efficacious grace — but at present, after the fall of Adam, the will having remained wounded and inclined to evil, it has need of efficacious grace to apply it, by means of the victorious delectation, to put good into act. But according to this reasoning of that System, granted that (I say) the will of man has remained so infirm that, in order to operate in the present state, it has need of efficacious grace, it cannot be said that man has any longer, in virtue of sufficient grace — not even in the first act, and neither in the composed nor in the divided sense — the complete and proximately ready power to observe the precepts, or to be able to perform any good act whatever, not even a mediate one, by which he may dispose himself afterwards to obtain the greater help to fulfill the law.
I am well aware that the Advocates of this opinion do not refuse to concede this, saying that at present sufficient grace does not give a complete and ready power: Gratia sufficiens (writes Fr. Macedo, one of these Advocates) non dat potentiam proxime completam, et expeditam. (Sufficient grace does not give a power proximately complete and ready.) And in another place speaking of the grace of innocent Adam and of fallen Adam, he says: Prima supponebat (potentiam) expeditam et liberam, secunda impeditam et servam. (The former supposed a power ready and free; the latter, one hindered and enslaved.)
Nay, granted that the grace inferior to concupiscence does not give the complete and unimpeded power to observe the precepts, in truth it can no longer be called sufficient. As in fact the aforementioned Fr. Berti, who defends such a system of relatively victorious delectation, finds no difficulty in conceding further that such inferior grace should properly be called inefficacious grace, and not sufficient. So that, according to this system, those who do not receive from God efficacious grace by means of relatively victorious delectation do not even have sufficient grace to be able to fulfill the precepts. Here is what Fr. Berti writes in the Defense he makes of his opinion; first he sets forth there the three objections that his adversaries raise against him, which are the following: Tria sunt, quae Jansenianum redolent dogma, et quinque damnatarum propositionum sunt fons et origo, a quibus novi Janseniani, quos inter eminent duo haud dubie spurii Augustinenses (that is, Fr. Bellelli and Fr. Berti, against whom the Archbishop of Vienna is writing), minime abhorrent. Horum primum est, quod non tantum in delectatione victrici reponunt gratiam efficientem, sed in delectatione victrici relativa, etc. Alterum, quod negant in delectatione inferioris gradus potentiam proxime expeditam, ad hanc requirentes ex parte potentiae et actus primi robustiorem delectationem; ideoque gratia inefficax (sive adjutorium sine quo ab ipsis depraedicatum) non est vera gratia sufficiens, neque Molinistico sensu, neque Thomistico, cum gratia sufficiens communi sensu Catholicorum conferat ipsam potentiam proxime expeditam. Tertium, quod hinc consequitur, veram gratiam sufficientem e medio tollunt, a cujus etiam nomine fraudulenter abhorrent; illam potius inefficacem, quam sufficientem appellantes (There are three things that smack of the Jansenist dogma and are the fount and origin of the five condemned Propositions, from which the new Jansenists — among whom two undoubtedly spurious Augustinians stand out — by no means shrink. The first of these is that they place efficacious grace not only in victorious delectation, but in relatively victorious delectation, etc. The second, that they deny that in the delectation of an inferior degree there is a power proximately unimpeded, requiring for it, on the part of the power and of the first act, a stronger delectation; and therefore inefficacious grace (or the "help without which" proclaimed by them) is not true sufficient grace, neither in the Molinist sense nor in the Thomist, since sufficient grace, in the common understanding of Catholics, confers the very power proximately unimpeded. The third, which follows from this, is that they do away with true sufficient grace altogether, shrinking fraudulently even from its name, calling it rather inefficacious than sufficient). This is what his opponents object to him; here is how he answers them: Ego vero firmissime et absque ulla haesitatione pronuntio, tria doctrinae capita nuperrime commemorata nequaquam erronea esse, nec damnatarum propositionum principia; sed aliquos Jansenii quidem refutandi zelo permotos, sed propriae sententiae praejudicio abreptos, quid Catholicum sit, quid erroneum ac damnatum minime distinxisse, atque ex horum lucubrationibus causam arripuisse sciolum Anonymum (that is, the Archbishop
of Vienna mentioned above); et si qui alii sunt, curtae eruditionis, et pinguis minervae homines, inconcussa Augustini dogmata (quae, velint nolint, sunt eadem ac nostra) tanquam portenta haeresum calumniandi (But I most firmly and without any hesitation pronounce that the three heads of doctrine just mentioned are in no wise erroneous, nor the sources of the condemned propositions; but that certain men — moved indeed by zeal to refute Jansenius, yet carried away by prejudice in favor of their own opinion — have not at all distinguished what is Catholic from what is erroneous and condemned; and that the pedant Anonymous, and if there are any others, men of scant learning and gross wit, have seized from their lucubrations an occasion to calumniate the unshaken dogmas of Augustine (which, whether they will it or not, are the same as ours) as portents of heresies).
Now precisely one of these men of scant learning and gross mind, I confess myself also to be, since I do not understand how the Propositions of Fr. Berti agree with one another, for their consequences clearly appear the one repugnant to the other. If he said that to observe the Divine precepts efficacious grace is needed, but that sufficient grace, which is given to all, gives the proximate power to pray, and that by prayer the greater help necessary to actually observe the precepts is then obtained, we would be in agreement; for this is precisely our opinion, which we shall set forth and prove in the following chapter. But no; for, speaking of prayer, he does indeed say that each of the faithful, through sufficient grace, if he places no obstacle, can pray, and by praying obtain the immediate help to actually observe the precepts: Cuilibet fideli (these are his words) nisi libere ponat obicem, adest gratia orationis, qua possit impetrare auxilium immediate sufficiens ad implenda mandata (To each of the faithful, unless he freely places an obstacle, the grace of prayer is present, by which he can obtain the help immediately sufficient for fulfilling the commandments). And he says more elsewhere, that the aforesaid sufficient grace, already common to every one of the faithful, although it is remotely sufficient for the observance of the precepts, is nevertheless proximately sufficient for prayer, through which efficacious grace is then obtained; writing thus: In eo qui habet voluntatem parvam (which is that will administered to all by sufficient grace) est potentia proxime sufficiens ad orandum, et sufficiens remote ad observantiam praeceptorum, quae poterit proxime implere; dum per orationem obtinuerit robustam voluntatem which robust will is administered by efficacious grace (In him who has a weak will there is a power proximately sufficient for praying and remotely sufficient for the observance of the precepts, which he will be able to fulfill proximately when through prayer he has obtained a robust will). He says then, and wisely says, that as regards the observance of the precepts it cannot be said that sufficient grace gives all the proximate power to actually observe them; because (as he well observes in the passage cited a little above at IV) the proximate power to observe the precepts is that which needs no other means to pass into act; hence he writes in the same
IV, near the beginning, that complete and unimpeded power can be had only from efficacious grace: Gratia efficax sola dat potentiam completam, et expeditam (Efficacious grace alone gives complete and unimpeded power). Therefore he adds that in order for sufficient grace to be called proximately sufficient to operate in act, requiritur ut alio medio non egeat, ut exeat in actum (it is required that it need no other means to pass into act). So that, according to the reasoning of Fr. Berti, sufficient grace does not in fact administer to each of the faithful the proximate power to observe the precepts, but it does administer to all the power proximately sufficient to pray. Therefore each of the faithful, with sufficient grace alone, can actually pray without need of another means, that is, of efficacious grace.
But then I do not know how this agrees with what he says elsewhere: Nullus absque gratia per se efficaci habet potentiam orandi conjunctam cum actu (No one, without grace efficacious in itself, has the power of praying conjoined with act). Therefore, according to this other Proposition, sufficient grace does not in truth, but only in name, give the power proximately sufficient to pray; it gives the power only remotely sufficient, since efficacious grace is needed for the power of praying to pass into act. Either, then, efficacious grace is required to actually pray, and in that case sufficient grace cannot be said to give the proximately sufficient power; or sufficient grace gives the power proximately sufficient to actually pray, and in that case there is no need of the efficacious grace of preponderant delectation, as he requires. But St. Augustine too, says Fr. Berti, requires victorious delectation to actually pray, saying: Augustinus docet necessariam esse ad orandum certam scientiam et victricem delectationem (Augustine teaches that certain knowledge and victorious delectation are necessary for praying). I have wished to examine the text of the holy Doctor, which reads thus: Intelligamus, si possumus, Dominum Deum bonum ideo etiam Sanctis suis alicujus operis justi aliquando non tribuere, vel certam scientiam, vel victricem delectationem, ut cognoscant non a seipsis, sed ab Illo sibi esse lucem, qua illuminentur tenebrae eorum, et suavitatem qua det fructum suum terra eorum (Let us understand, if we can, that the good Lord God for this reason sometimes does not grant even to His Saints, in some just work, either certain knowledge or victorious delectation: that they may know that the light by which their darkness is illumined, and the sweetness by which their land yields its fruit, is theirs not from themselves but from Him). St. Augustine does not in fact say that the victorious delectation is necessary for praying; here he says only that God sometimes does not give even to His Saints either the certain knowledge or the victorious delectation of some just work: so that they may know that from Him, and not from themselves, they have the light that enlightens them and the sweetness that makes them bear fruit.
Therefore the Saint here, in the first place, is not speaking of sufficient grace, with which man can act but does not always act, nor does he say that man with sufficient grace alone and without efficacious grace cannot actually pray; but he is speaking only of efficacious grace, which by means of victorious delectation infallibly makes him act well. Secondly, he is not speaking here of prayer, but of the just work, which properly means the observance of the precepts or of the counsels; for prayer, although it is a good work, by its nature is not the work, but is the means for obtaining the help to perform the good work.
We too hold, as has been said above, that efficacious grace is necessary for the observance of the precepts; but we say that to pray actually, and by prayer to obtain the efficacious grace, the sufficient grace that God grants to every believer is enough. And thus it is well secured that the divine precepts are impossible to no one, since every man with sufficient grace alone can do the easy things, such as praying, and by means of prayer will obtain the aid of efficacious grace — gratuitous, and necessary for actually doing the difficult things, which is the observance of the precepts. So speaks precisely Cardinal de Noris, whose words I shall report in the following chapter; and so before him did St. Augustine teach, saying: Eo ipso quod firmissime creditur Deum impossibilia non praecipere, hinc admonemur et in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus (By the very fact that it is most firmly believed that God does not command impossibilities, we are admonished both what we are to do in easy things and what we are to ask in difficult ones). Otherwise, if sufficient grace were not enough to pray actually, but efficacious grace were always needed, and this were denied to anyone — as in fact efficacious grace is denied to many — I do not see how the divine precepts could be called possible for such a man, or how God could require of him (while denying him also the efficacious grace of actually praying) the observance of His law, and then justly condemn him to hell if he does not observe it. This is precisely what led Jansenius to say that some precepts are impossible even for the just, because he erroneously held that some lack the grace by which the precepts are rendered possible for them. But no; for God gives to all (we here leave aside the infidels and the obstinate) the proximate grace of actually praying, as we shall prove in the following chapter; and so the excuse that the observance of the precepts was impossible for him can avail no one, if he does not observe them; because although he may not have had efficacious grace to observe them in act, he nevertheless had the proximate grace sufficient for actually praying, by means of which — according to His promise to hear whoever prays — he would have obtained from God the efficacious grace with which he would certainly have observed the precepts. And this is precisely what the Council of Trent declared against Luther, who asserted that the observance of the divine law was impossible even for believers, saying: Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis (God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding He admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot, and He helps you so that you may be able).
d Graves. Class. I. Ep. I. pag. 9.
aa Bajan. et Jans. rediv. Appen. pag. 6.
ab P. Serry Praelect.....
ac S. Thom. de Malo qu. 6. art. unic.
ad S. Aug. lib. de duab. Anim. c. 18.
ae Petav. lib. 3. de Opere Sex. dier. c. 2. n. 7.
af Petav. loco mox cit. num. 3.
ag S. Aug. Ep. ad Gal. n. 49.
ah Calvin. lib. 3. de lib. arb. adv. Pighium.
ai S. Aug. de Mus. lib. 6. num. 29. tom. I.
al Idem Confess. lib. 13. cap. 10.
am Idem ib. 6. de Music. num. 29. tom. I.
an Vide ibid.
ao Idem in Jo. tract. 26. num. 14. tom. 3.
ap Vide ibid.
aq Ibid.
ar Idem Ep. ad Gal. num. 54.
as S. Aug. Vide Conf.
at Idem. Serm. 155. alias 6 de Verb. Ap. cap. 9.
au Idem lib. 12. de Civ. Dei cap. 6.
av S. Aug. lib. 3. de lib. arb. n. 8. alias c. 3.
az Idem lib. 2. de Act. cum Fel. Manich. c. 3. ec.
ax Bellarm. lib. 5. de lib. arb. c. 28.
ay S. Aug. de Grat. et lib. arb. n. 4. alias c. 2.
ba Idem lib. 2. de Nuptiis etc. n. 8. alias c. 3.
bb S. Aug. de Grat. Cri. n. 52. alias Cap. 48.
bc S. Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 56. n. 1.
bd S. Aug. de lib. arb. cap. I.
be Idem lib. de Fide contra Manich. cap. 9 et 10.
bf Idem lib. de Spirit. et litt. cap. 34.
bg S. Aug. l. 2. de Act. cum Fel. Manich. c. 4.
bh Idem lib. 2. de Grat. cap. 4.
bi Juenin. Inst. theol. t. 5. p. 6. Diss. I art. 3.
bl Corn. Jans. Syst. confut. p. II. num. 45 et 46. alias pag. 346. n. 259.
bm Tournely Praelect. theol. tom. 3. qu. 3. in Prop. V. Jans. qu. 2. infra n. 4.
bn Idem Theol. ad usum Semin. To. 5. p. 2. qu. 5. a. I. Concl. 5.
bo S. Thom. I. 2. q. 109. a. 5.
bp Abbas de Bourzeis Collat. 4. cap. 30.
bq Tour. Prael. Theol. tom. 3. p. 2. q. 9. n. 2. Obijic. 6.
br August. Syst. vindic. Diss. 5. cap. 3. n. 4.
bs Gonet Man. to. 4. tract. 7. cap. 10.
bt Gotti to. 2. de Grat. Dub. 6. § 2.
bu P. Franc. Macedo Scrin. pag. 88. et 89.
bv Idem Cortina pag. 203.
bz Berti Tom. II. lib. 18. cap. VIII. prop. IV.
bx Tom. VII. Diss. IV. Vindic. ec. Cap. I. § 9. num. 5. vers. Verum.
by Berti Tom. II. lib. 18. cap. VIII. Prop. V.
ca August. lib. 2. de Peccat. meritis Cap. 19.
cb S. Aug. de Nat. et gratia Cap. 69. n. 83.